

# ISRAEL — SOUTH AFRICA



Cooperation of  
Imperialistic Outposts

## INHALT

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## EDITORIAL

As a centre for the support of progressive African and Arab interests in Europe and especially in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) the German African Arab Bureau (daab) and its publishing house „Progress Dritte Welt“ (pdw, progress third world), which prepared this special edition of its bi-monthly „3. Welt Magazin“ (Third World Magazin), feels obliged to draw attention to an event, that for the first time indicated very clearly how far the so called realpolitik of US-imperialism and its European shareholders has been developed to dominate and exploit the African and Arab World through their outposts Israel and South Africa. During a historical week from the 21st to the 27th of June, 1976, Kissinger, Allon und Vorster visited the Federal Republic of Germany — after the US Foreign Minister had been touring through some African countries to evaluate new positions for the US policy necessary since the people's forces in Angola gained a main victory against imperialism in Africa — after Vorster's visit to Israel, demonstrating the military and economic axis Pretoria — Tel Aviv — after Chancellor Schmidt's visit to Riad, where he did not just talk business but promised to exert his influence on his friends in Israel towards greater flexibility on the Palestine question.

The week from the 21st to the 27th of June was a week of grand design on a new stage of imperialistic strategies which after the defeat in Vietnam is changing from a

policy of direct intervention to a concept of dominating capitalistic spheres of interest through subimperialistic centers like Brazil in Latin America, Indonesia in South East Asia, Iran in the Middle East, whereas it is up to Israel and South Africa to influence and regulate limited conflicts (Lebanon, Rhodesia). The main issue of the recent talks of Kissinger, Allon and Vorster was, how to secure and utilize Israel and South Africa as imperialistic strong-holds being increasingly challenged by opposition, demonstrations, revolts, and revolutionary armed struggle at home and getting more and more isolated in international politics and especially in the Third World. This being expressed in the UN-Resolution No 3379 (XXX), 10th November, 1975, stating that „Zionism is a form of racism and race-discrimination“.

As far as South Africa and Israel are concerned imperialistic strategy aims at

- „Modernizing“ the social and especially the racial systems in both countries.
- better integration of both clients into a network of subimperialistic centers, which means for instance FRG supplies Brazil, Iran and South Africa with nuclear know-how and nuclear enrichment plants, while South Africa co-operates with Israel in nuclear questions. The Iran buys uranium from South Africa while refusing an oil boycott against Israel and the uranium supplier etc.
- exerting influence on the liberation movements, trying to split them on controversial issues and offering support to groups with

no socialistic and less progressive attitudes.

- hindering progressive Third World Countries on their way to solidar political action which serves their common interests, e.g. on the issue of the recognition and support of liberation movements. Remember how the US tried to split OAU on the Angola-question and the exponents against MPLA recognition are the very same group of states refusing support for the Palestinian cause, for liberation in Zimbabwe and South Africa as for F POLISARIO in the West-Sahara a recent conflict initiated by Maroc with US-support to occupy the phosphat monopol and to hinder Algeria in its leading role for a just new international economic order.

The imperialistic techniques to destruct African-Arab unity are very simple and obvious, as was expressed by the Nigerian Foreign Ministry calling the efforts of President Ford to prevent OAU-recognition for MPLA an insult to the intelligence of the African nations.

Nevertheless, they are still efficient, and this special edition of our 3. World Magazine may give you some more background on the co-operation between Israel and South Africa, from the historical point of view as well as recent imperialistic quadrangle conception USA-FRG (the economic and increasingly political center of the European community) — Israel and South Africa.

*D. Habicht-Benthin,  
Secretary General*

# The Paradoxical Triangle

Zionism, South Africa and Apartheid

Richard P. Stevens

Considering the anti-Semitic record of the Nationalist Party in South Africa in the years preceding its electoral victory of 1948, Professor Keppel-Jones' prediction about the same time of an officially sanctioned pogrom in 1956<sup>1)</sup> appeared to many as fully consistent with Nationalist record. It was, after all, as recently as 1930 that Dr. Daniel F. Malan introduced his immigration quota bill restricting immigration from Eastern Europe. When Hitler's attacks upon German Jewry led to the immigration of several thousand German Jews Nazi-inspired elements within the Nationalist Party openly advocated that South Africa adopt similar measures.

The blatant anti-Semitic policy of the Nationalist Party continued until 1945. Through its attacks on "Jewish democracy" and "Jewish capitalism" the Party indicated that Jews were not far behind "kafirs" in terms of its defined prejudices. During this period some Afrikaaners favored the disfranchisement of all "unassimilable" groups and Jews were

specifically included in this category. Rarely was a person of Jewish background admitted to the Nationalist Party and through its recognized organ, 'Die Transvaler', edited by Dr. Verwoerd, the "Jewish imperialistic war machine" and Jewish immigration was attacked. The anti-Jewish policies of the Nationalist Party were officially proclaimed in their election manifesto of 1938 and reaffirmed three years later. Not even the defeat of Nazi Germany in April 1945 brought an immediate end to Nationalist support of Nazi principles.<sup>2)</sup>

## The South Africa Jewish Community and Zionism

By 1945 the South African Jewish community was set at something over 105,000 and grew to 120,000 five years later.<sup>3)</sup> While not the dominant economic force in the country, Jews clearly controlled certain industries such as clothing manufacture and the cinema. Although few Jews were farmers those who turned to agriculture were heavy investors in machinery and both the "potatoe king" and the



'maize king" were Jews. By 1948, however, approximately 46 per cent were South African born. Despite their original poverty, Jewish immigrants, like all white immigrants to South Africa, quickly discovered that the racial inequalities of the country allowed for upward group mobility; the working class element soon became a small minority. According to many observers, the South African Jewish community had, by the end of the war, become the wealthiest Jewish community in the world on a per capita basis. 4) Nor was the size of the Jewish community, as Rabbi Dr. Andre Ungar observed, a true reflection of the position of the Jews in South African life: "South Africa is the land par excellence where minorities can have a say — and a vast majority be deprived of it — quite without regard to what, in a democracy, their numbers would warrant. And in the two main cities, Johannesburg and Cape Town, the Jews constitute one-tenth of the citizens 'that count': the Whites..." 5)

### **Zionist Influence**

Jewish institutions reflected the Zionist priorities and interests of the community. The main organs of Jewish life were the South African Zionist Federation, founded in 1895 and the South African Jewish Board of Deputies (1912). These bodies were not mutually exclusive, however, and even before 1948 Zionists not only "formed the majority of the Board of Deputies but also occupied the leading posts in the Jewish community." 6) By 1948 fully 99 per cent of

South African Jews were Zionist affiliated. 7) In short, Zionism was without question the primary cultural expression and group concern of South African Jewry. Although Sachs estimated that the right-wing or revisionist form of Zionism accounted for only 15 per cent of the total Jewish strength while the moderate United Zionist Party attracted the bulk of Jewish membership, considerable numbers of all factions were expressing strong contempt by 1944 for British opposition to extreme Zionist demands regarding Palestine. Thus, while Jews traditionally favored British attachments as a bulwark of democracy against the philosophy of the Nationalist Party, confrontation between Jewish terrorist groups and British soldiers in Palestine brought a substantial decline in British orientation at the precise moment when the Nationalist Party was preparing its assault on continued South African attachments with the British Crown. Ironically, however, South African Jewish concern for Palestine was not merely the outgrowth of ordinary Zionist interests which, during the aftermath of Hitlerism, had won over American and British Jewry to Zionist political goals. It also reflected community concern that the increasing strength of the Nationalist Party might in fact necessitate a Jewish exodus.

### **The Nationalist Party Adopts a New Jewish Policy**

Notwithstanding its legacy of virulent anti-Semitism the Nationalist Party had found reason by 1948 to modify dramatically its attitude towards the Jewish com-

### **South African and Israeli Racists Plot**

News has come through of the visit of Mr. Rabin of Israel by Mr. Vorster of the South African racist regime. This visit is the highlight of a long standing development of cooperation between these two of the most dangerous states threatening peace today. Israel in the Middle East and South Africa in Africa. This visit confirms the closest cooperation in economic, political and armaments fields. We have no doubt this will also include atomic cooperation for the purpose of war against neighbouring states and confrontation with the national liberation movements.

We call upon all democrats, anti-racists and all those who cherish peace in the world, to take heed of this latest strategic cooperation and to take every possible step to expose it, challenge it where ever possible, and to render unworkable any form of assistance to the racists of both countries.

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munity. Not only was it a case of perceiving the necessity of white solidarity if a minority racial regime were to be maintained but rather the nature of the Jewish community itself and events involving Britain in Pale-

stine made a new policy both attractive and expedient. According to Dr. Edwin S. Munger, a long-time observer of the South African scene, the post-war Jewish-Afrikaner (1) rapprochement was also due to the feeling of highly influential Afrikaners that "the elimination of Jews from South Africa would shake the country to its foundations" 8) since any implementation of discrimination would lead to the withdrawal by wealthy Jews of sufficient capital to precipitate an economic slump.

As the 1948 general election approached there were growing signs indicating a switch in Nationalist thought. Not only did the Afrikaans press support of Zionist opposition to British policies in Palestine, which since 1939 had moved away from endorsing Jewish statehood against the wishes of the Arab majority, but it compared the determination of the Afrikaners to break the Union's British ties with the Zionist undertaking. In various localities Nationalist politicians openly began to seek favor of influential Jews and a dialogue was opened in Cape Town between several prominent Jews and leading Nationalists. But it was the creation of the State of Israel on May 14, 1948, only a few days before the May 26 election, which especially influenced Nationalist attitudes.

Richard Weisbord observed that it was " ... not coincidental that the turning away of the Nationalist Party from overt anti-Semitism occurred at the same time as the goal of the political Zionist movement, the creation of the state of Israel, was realized." 9)

Israel's declaration of independence had very immediate repercussions on South African politics in a most unexpected way, since it raised the question of diplomatic recognition. Despite the fact that Prime Minister Smuts was a life-long supporter of Zionism and a close, personal friend of Chaim Weizmann, the Zionist leader 10) Smuts only extended de facto recognition to the new state. Although reticence in this matter might have been due as much to Smuts' own regard for British sensibilities as to Anglo-South African sentiment, he also feared that the Nationalist Party would make political capital of an action so clearly welcome in the Jewish community. Ironically, the Prime Minister's action not only had the effect of alienating some English-speaking voters "who had no love for Jews of any kind and bitter hatred of the gunmen of Palestine who were murdering British soldiers ..." 11) but it enabled Dr. Malan to use Smuts' action to proclaim by way of contrast his own "true friendship" for the Jewish people, a people whose race-consciousness would enable them to "more easily understand and respect the same feeling in the case of every other section of the community." 12) Immediately after the narrow Nationalist victory of May 26, the Malan Government extended de jure recognition to Israel.

**"Non-discrimination  
against any Whites."**

Diplomatic recognition of Israel was quickly followed by other actions calculated to win Jewish support. Six weeks after taking office Dr. Malan declared that

both he and his government stood for a policy of non-discrimination against any section of the white population and looked forward, he said, to the day when there would no longer be any talk of the Jewish question in the country. 13) Going beyond the position of most other countries favorable to Israel, Dr. Malan not only permitted Jewish reserve officers to serve in Israel, a procedure officially contrary to law, but he became the first Prime Minister in the British Commonwealth to pay a courtesy visit to the new state. When, despite serious financial problems then facing South Africa the Government permitted the export of much needed commodities and currency to Israel, Malan's victory with the Jewish community was virtually complete. Thereafter the Jewish South African community would send more

"The Jews as a community had decided to take no stand on the native question, because they were involved with the problem of assisting Jewry in other lands. South African Jewry was doing more to help Israel than any other group. The community could not ask for the government's permission to export funds and goods, and at the same time, object to the government."

*Rabbi M. C. Weiler, Speech to Eighth International Conference of the World Union of Progressive Judaism, London, 1953 cited in F. Flesch documentation, p. 189.*

## Vorster in Israel

MOUNT OF OLIVES  
AND SHARM E-SHEIKH

## Rabin lauds South Africa's detente bid

**P**retoria's efforts for African detente and prosperous coexistence without interference were lauded by Prime Minister Rabin at a dinner in Jerusalem Sunday night in honour of visiting South African Prime Minister John Vorster.

After voicing "South Africa's long support of Israel as a free and independent Jewish State", Mr. Rabin said: "I believe both our countries share the problem of how to build regional dialogue, coexistence and stability in face of foreign-inspired instability and recklessness."

"This is why", he went on, addressing Mr. Vorster, "We here follow with sympathy your own historic efforts to achieve detente on your continent, to build bridges for a secure and better future, to create coexistence that will guarantee a prosperous atmosphere of cooperation for all the African peoples, without outside interference and threat."

Earlier, officials in Jerusalem firmly denied that Vorster was here to buy arms or to set up an "anti-Communist alliance." There has been speculation to this effort in some press reports from Pretoria.

Mr. Vorster himself told newsmen

on Friday that talk of an impending arms deal was "utter nonsense". Israel's ambassador to Pretoria, Yitzhak Unna, who is here for the visit, told a radio interviewer that Israel's and South Africa's defence needs were quite different.

Mr. Unna said the visit had no "specific diplomatic goal." It signified the improving relations between the two countries. South Africa had been one of the few countries that had not turned its back on Israel after the Yom Kippur War, the envoy noted, and relations had become increasingly normalized since the two countries had raised the level of their representations to full embassies following the war.

He said South Africans regarded Israel as frontline bulwark against Soviet expansionism. The invitation to Mr. Vorster by no means implied approval for South Africa's apartheid system, Mr. Unna added. Israel maintained normal relations with many states whose internal systems it did not approve of — and vice versa.

Mr. Vorster was quoted by Israel Radio as commenting during a tour to Sharm e-Sheikh Saturday that "relations with Israel have never been so good." He did not



*Vorster in Masada, Israel*



think, the radio said, that his visit here would harm South Africa's relations with its Arab oil suppliers.

The visit to Sharm e-Sheikh was the first by a visiting head of government. Mr. Vorster commented to his Israeli guides that he could well understand the strategic significance of the place.

Accompanied by the commander of the Navy, Aluf Binyamin Telem, Mr. Vorster visited the nearby naval base and toured a Reshef class missile boat.

Mr. Vorster and his party flew to Sharm in an Arkia Herald, flying low over the Santa Katarina monastery en route. From Sharm, they flew to Masada, where they heard an account of the Zealots' last stand from archaeologist Gideon Ferster.

Mr. Vorster, who flew into Israel late Thursday night with his Foreign Minister, Hilgard Muller, their wives, 12 officials and 14 newsmen, began his visit on Friday morning with a service at the Yad Vashem Holocaust Memorial. "Remarkable", he commented in a low voice, as Memorial director Yitzhak Arad explained the exhibits.

Vorster himself had opposed his country's participation on the side of the Allies in World War Two, and was interned for anti-Allies activities.

He listened with bowed head as South African clergyman intoned psalms in Afrikaans, and a cantor sang the El Male Rahanim prayer for the dead. Then he laid a wreath in his country's national colours and kindled the "eternal flame".

From Yad Vashem the motorcade headed for the Israel Museum where South African-born curator, Mrs. Hadassah Levin, guided Vor-

ster and his party around the Shrine of the Book. The visiting Premier, who was plainly fascinated by the ancient Isaiah manuscript, swapped biblical verses in Afrikaans with Mrs. Levin.

The party then toured Bethlehem as guest of Mayor Elias Freij.

On Friday afternoon Mr. Vorster paid a courtesy call on President Katzir. He spent the evening with Mayor Teddy Kollek and guests at the mayor's home.

Mr. and Mrs. Vorster spent Palm Sunday visiting Christian sites in Jerusalem and Galilee.

They first attended prayers at the Garden Tomb in Nablus Road, then visited the Mount of Olives.

As the Vorsters stood viewing the panorama below them, a group of tourists from South Africa's Natal provinces drove up in a minibus, spotted their Prime Minister and began singing the South African national anthem, in Afrikaans.

The Prime Minister turned to the tourists, took off his hat and stood silently.

He then walked over to the dozen tourists and started shaking hands. "This is a very emotional moment for me", he was quoted as saying in Afrikaans. "I appreciate it very much."

A member of his party told The Jerusalem Post afterwards that Vorster's party had been very impressed by the beauty of the holy places, and the very good condition in which they are kept.

They were due to leave Israel yesterday, after visiting an Air Force base and the Israel Aircraft Industries.

*The Jerusalem Post Weekly,*  
13. April 1976

money per capita to Israel "than any Jewish group in the world — far exceeding the Americans — and a higher percentage of settlers ... (would go) to Israel from South Africa than ... (from) other countries where Jews are relatively prosperous." 14)

### **Acceptance of Nationalist Party Policies**

The response of the Jewish community to Nationalist support of Israel and its official abrogation of anti-Semitism brought about an acceptance of Nationalist Party policies at all levels of formal Jewish expression. In 1951 the Chairman of the Jewish Board of Deputies extended sincere thanks to the Government for its pro-Israel sentiment and for appreciating the feelings of the Jewish community towards Israel. At the same time, however, he expressed disappointment that Jews were still barred in most regions from Nationalist Party membership. Within a few months the Transvaal Congress of the Party lifted its ban on Jewish membership and this action was quickly followed by the Orange Free State and Natal Congresses. Subsequent elections in South Africa saw an ever growing number of Jews backing the Nationalist Party.

Upon the election of Dr. Verwoerd as Prime Minister in 1958 a deputation from the Jewish Board of Deputies extended formal congratulations. The Government's appointment in 1960 of Dr. Percy Yutar as Deputy Attorney-General of the Transvaal put to rest any lingering doubts which might have existed concerning the ability of Jews to attain high governmental

positions. Yutar, as president of the Johannesburg United Hebrew Congregation and president of the South African Board of Education Fund, would distinguish himself as prosecutor in the infamous Rivonia trial of the African National Congress leader, Nelson Mandela and his associates, several of whom were Jewish; he was elevated in 1968 to become Attorney-General of the Orange Free State. The Prime Minister's assurances to the Jewish community also meant that South African Zionists would be permitted to continue sending some 700.000 dollars annually to Israel. Israeli gratitude for Dr. Verwoerd's attitude was formally expressed in April 1959 by Dr. M. Nurok, a visiting member of the Israeli parliament, who said: "We are very grateful to the South African Government for the part it has played in helping Israel to attain its present status. South African Jews who have settled in Israel are staunch patriots of the Union." 15)

### **Complicity in Apartheid**

Such a cordial state of relations between the Nationalist Government and the Jewish community immediately raised the moral question of Jewish complicity in apartheid, a complicity which seemed to go considerably beyond that which might be attributed to other religious groups in South Africa. As Henry Katzew, assistant editor of the Johannesburg Zionist Record, acknowledged, the Jewish community found itself after 1948 in a unique situation "in which the government was sympathetic to the Jewish community and harsh and discriminating against other elements in the po-

"It was ... a complete misunderstanding to look on Israeli action as a moral stand. Israeli diplomats had visited the emergent African States and they sought support from these States against the Arabs at the U. N. They were perfectly entitled to do this, but to regard their action as being based on moral grounds was a euphemism."

*Jewish Chronicle (London),  
November 30, 1962*

pulation, in this case, the African, Colored and Indians." 16) Immediately following the Nationalist Party victory the editor of Jewish Affairs pointed out that "the only safeguard for peace lies in just treatment and the progressive promotion of the well-being and the development of these underprivileged groups." But as Katzew admitted, "this was the last time Jewish Affairs was to speak in such emphatic terms." 17)

Even the Sharpeville massacre of March 1960, which brought condemnation of South Africa from most governments, including the United States, and virtually all religious bodies, did not succeed in breaking the silence of the South African Jewish press or the Board of Deputies. Instead, as Mr. Charles Hoppenstein, a member of the Board for thirty years affirmed in London a few months later, "A majority of us are supporting the Union Government's policy in connection with apartheid," and sincerely appreciated the fact that

South Africa had opened its doors to more than 1,500 Jewish refugees from the Congo. 18)

### **Israeli Condemnation of Apartheid, 1961...**

From 1948 until mid-1961 Nationalist spokesmen, the Government and the Afrikaans press were unstinting in their praise of Israel. But suddenly, in July 1961, this harmonious atmosphere was shattered by Israel's decision to expand her diplomatic offensive in Black Africa which had been under way since 1956. In November Israel cast its vote in the General Assembly in support of a resolution which deprecated South Africa's policy of apartheid "as being reprehensible and repugnant to the dignity and rights of peoples and individuals."

The response of the South African Government and the Afrikaans press to Israel's "about-face" was predictably bitter. 'Die Transvaler' asked what the government of Israel would think if, uninvited, South Africa concerned itself with Arab refugees who, for thirteen years, "lived on Israel's borders in the most wretched conditions because they are not allowed to return to their original homes."

Dr. Verwoerd lashed out by making the unflattering observation that the Jews "took Israel from the Arabs after the Arabs had lived there for a thousand years. In that I agree with them, Israel, like South Africa, is an apartheid state." (*Rand Daily Mail*, November 23, 1961)

Thereafter the Government rescinded the special concessions in foreign currency regulations which



*Victims of Soweto*

allowed Jewish organizations to transfer money and goods to Israel despite the restrictions in effect since Sharpeville. Henceforth application for the transfer of funds would be considered on their merits.

### **...Criticised by South African Zionists**

South African Jews were also horrified by Israel's actions and severely discomforted by the Prime Minister's remarks. The Zionist Record, official organ of the South African Zionist Federation, voiced regret that "Israel's delegation found it fitting to vote with the 67 rather than abstain with the Western group of nations ..." 19) The Jewish Herald, organ of the Zionist Revisionists, sharply criticised Israel for voting against "one of Israel's staunchest friends as unwarranted, unjustified and politically unrealistic." It belittled Israel's decision to place priority on winning dubious Afro-Asian friendship.

The South African Jewish Board of Deputies passed a resolution stating that "Israel should have joined the other Western nations in abstaining from voting against South Africa." 20) "As Jewish citizens of South Africa who have special ties with Israel," said Mr. Suzman, "it was felt that the South African Jewish Board of Deputies should draw Israel's attention to this aspect of the matter." In the back of many Jewish minds was the analogy between the Afrikaner and the Israeli positions and they could not help but ask, said Mr. Katzew, whether there were "any circumstances at present imaginable in which

the Jews of Israel would consent to share power with an Arab majority" any more than Afrikaners would with Africans. 21)

But in response to suggestions from Dr. Verwoerd that the Jewish community should in any way be held accountable for Israel's declaration, there was a forthright declaration in the Jewish Times that Jews must stand firm for their rights and dignity. Shortly thereafter Dr. Verwoerd publicly stated that "neither the actions of Israel at the United Nations nor the action of certain people in the land must lead to the existence of anti-Semitism." 22) The matter was then brought to a close when the Board of Deputies expressed its satisfaction with Dr. Verwoerd's explanation that his criticism of Israel had nothing to do with the Government's attitude towards Jewish citizens. Following the Prime Minister's assassination in September 1966, the South African Jewish Times could write of Verwoerd: "It was one of the marks of his statesmanship that he curbed past currents which sometimes washed against the Jewish community, set himself up against any form of discrimination against Jews and appealed for the complete eradication of anti-Semitism from South African life." (September 9, 1966)

### **Organized Jewry Defends South Africa Abroad**

Whatever the apprehension Dr. Verwoerd's remarks had occasioned in the Jewish community there was no rupture in friendly relations with the Government. Rather, either through fear of a



revival of anti-Semitism, a belief in the South African system, or determination to carry on unimpeded with assistance to Israel, there was a notable increase in the efforts of the Board of Deputies and Zionist organizations to deflect criticism abroad of South Africa by other Jewish bodies. Following the approval of a statement by the Board of Deputies that "the Jewish community should take steps to explain South Africa's position to Jews overseas and at home," (Jewish Chronicle, London, Dec. 1962) a number of prominent Jews would assist with efforts to improve South Africa's image.

In 1961 Mr. Gustav Saron, co-author of 'The Jews in South Africa', and retired secretary-general of the Board of Deputies visited the United States and lectured under the auspices of B'nai B'rith. Always he urged on his audiences the necessity to respect South African sensitivities. And Mr. Henry Katzen, assistant editor of the Johannesburg Zionist Record would put the case for South Africa in the Jewish publication Midstream where he argued that "... if the world granted South Africa time to work out its own evolution, it could probably do so. The United Nations should keep barking at us to keep us on our political toes, but it would be shortsighted and wrong for it to press for sanctions against us and thus encompass our ruin ... It would be a gain if the world were to perceive that the problems of a rooted White nation in Africa are real." 23)

Even before Israel's anti-South African stance of 1961, the South

African Jewish Board of Deputies had counselled Jewish organizations abroad to refrain from commenting on South African problems. Thus, over the years, there would be no

"... A strange mixture of motives made it easy for Malan (and Strijdom has faithfully followed his lead since) and the Nationalists to offer enthusiastic support to the new state. There was a sense of affinity with the Israelis in having thrown off the British yoke. A psychologist might have called it admiration for the achievement by another of what was for them still a suppressed desire. Then — this is the view which was put to me by a leading Afrikaner intellectual with genuine feeling — many Nationalists saw the success of the Jews against the Arabs as a victory of White over non-White. Malan himself, growing old, displayed and voiced with much fervour a highly emotional people-of-the-book enthusiasm for the restoration of the Jews to their ancient homeland in accordance with Biblical prophecy."

*Dr. Leslie Rubin, a South African exile and a co-founder of the Liberal Party (also Jewish and former senator representing Non-whites) in: "Afrikaner Nationalism and the Jews", Africa South, Vol. 1, No. 3, 1957, p. 29.*

Jewish contributions to discussions on apartheid held under United Nations auspices. Like South Africa, all of the Jewish non-governmental organizations having consultative status with the United Nations — including the World Agudat, the World Union for Progressive Judaism, the World Jewish Congress, the Co-ordinating Board of Jewish Organizations (comprising the British and South African Jewish Board of Deputies and the B'nai B'rith) and the Consultative Council of Jewish Organizations (American Jewish Committee, the Alliance of France and the Anglo-Jewish Association) — declined to discuss the apartheid question.

#### **"Non-involvement"**

The history of world Jewish non-involvement in anti-apartheid efforts has been the main concern of Mr. Fritz Flesch of Detroit, himself a Jewish victim of Nazism at Dachau between 1938 and 1939. His investigations, covering more than a decade of activity, have not only documented the position of the South African Jewish community but, in Rabbi's Ungar's words, have revealed the general "pattern of evasion" displayed by world Jewish leadership in response to South African initiatives. In a revealing response to Flesch's inquiry to the Consultative Council of Jewish Organizations relative to their abstention from the apartheid issue, he was informed that "the policy of the Consultative Council has been to refrain from intervening in all but emergency situations immediately affecting our coreligionists." 24)


That the World Jewish Congress should resist any attack on the position of the Jewish community in South Africa was readily understandable, in the light of an earlier statement by Dr. Israel Goldstein, chairman of the Western Hemisphere Executive of that organization. After visiting South Africa in late 1959, Dr. Goldstein had reported to the Congress that the South African Jewish community was "the most Jewish-inspired community outside of Israel ... and deserves its reputation ... as measured by the criteria of synagogue affiliation, Jewish education and Zionist devotion, including not only their response to fund-raising appeals for Israel but immigration, pioneering and investments in Israel." 25) Dr. Goldstein's remarks were reported in all the various publications of the South African Information Office.

#### **Natural Sympathy with Zionism**

The Zionist character of the South African Jewish community and its

*South Africa's Bureau of State Security, General Hendrik Van den Bergh in an interview with Raphael Basha, of Yediot Aharanot, 16.8.1973:*

"I went to Israel recently, and enjoyed every moment there. I told the Prime Minister when I got back that as long as Israel exists we have a hope. If Israel should, God forbid, be destroyed, then South Africa would be in danger of extinction."



*So sorry, Sir, all seats reserved*

concern for the well-being of the State of Israel has had a profound impact on Israeli-South African relations. The growing political influence of the Jewish community upon the governmental and National Party structure, the natural sympathy of the Afrikaner populace with Zionist/Israeli philosophy and goals, as well as South African international priorities have combined to strengthen the pragmatic aspects of Israeli-South African relations. Thus, despite the setback in official relations resulting from Israel's 1961 condemnation of apartheid and subsequent reaffirmations of the same, the force of these countervailing currents had substantially filled the breach. As the South African Foundation, in its confidential newsletter, *Background to South African and World News*, noted in July 1967, the links between

Israel and South Africa have been forged on a variety of levels over the years. It pointed out, for example, that "several former South Africans hold prominent positions in Israel, such as Mr. Eban, the Israeli Foreign Minister, who was born in Cape Town, and Mr. Pincus, also born in South Africa, who was in 1966 elected chairman of the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem, the controlling body of the World Zionist Organization."

### **Pro-imperialistic Alliance**

South African concern with possible Soviet penetration into Africa and fear of Communist subversion of the country's political-social system elicited an early concern with Middle East defense arrangements advanced by the Western bloc, and served to complement Zionist efforts. As Dr. Malan informed the House of

"Israel and South Africa have a common lot. Both are engaged in a struggle for existence, and both are in constant clash with the decisive majorities in the United Nations. Both are reliable foci on strength within the region, which would, without them, fall into anti-Western anarchy. It is in South Africa's interest that Israel is successful in containing her enemies, who are among our own most vicious enemies; and Israel would have all the world against it if the navigation route around the Cape of Good Hope should be out of operation because South Africa's control is undermined. The anti-Western Powers have driven Israel and South Africa into a community of interests which had better be utilised than denied."

*DIE BURGER, Organ of the National Party in Cape Province, May 29, 1968*

Assembly in April 1952, South Africa stood ready to cooperate with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Commonwealth to create a Middle East Command "to stop the enemy from coming through the Middle East and from invading Africa through Egypt in the event of war ... what happens higher up in Africa must necessarily affect us." 26) In keeping with this concern, if not reciprocating it, Israel's Foreign Minister, Moshe Sha-

rett, visited South Africa shortly after the creation of Israel and an Israeli destroyer paid a courtesy call.

The military overthrow of the Egyptian monarchy in July 1952 and subsequent Pan-Africanist initiatives by the Nasser government occasioned growing South African alarm and concern for North African and Middle East affairs. Thus, the Suez crisis of 1956, while formally viewed as an internal affair, saw a basic South African sympathy for the tripartite powers and the Union conspicuously refrained from condemning the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt. "Some among the Afrikaner Nationalists," as Jitendra Mohan has observed, "found in the Suez crisis an opportunity for renewing their faith in the Union's race policies. This was done in the context of the general support enjoyed by Nasser's Egypt among the non-whites of Africa as the standard bearer of their emancipation from the Europeans." Throughout all stages of the Suez crisis the tone of sympathy for Israel persisted in the South African press.

## **Reduced**

### **Diplomatic Representation**

Israel's 1961 "about-face" also came at a time, as the South African Foundation observed, when Israel's exports were reaching nearly 84 million dollars a year of which only 1.4 million dollars went to South Africa. On the other side of the ledger, however, between 1951 and 1961 it was stated that South African Jews had sent more than 19.6 million dollars to Israel. 27) The temporary restriction on this outflow

was followed by the Israeli decision in September 1963 not to replace her Minister in South Africa and to reduce diplomatic representation to the level of "charge d'affaires". Even here, however, the actual state of Israeli-South African relations was not fully evident. For while re-criminations increased on the international level so did the volume of trade between the two countries. Israeli exports to South Africa thus increased from 1.4 million dollars in 1961 to 4 million dollars in 1967 while imports reached 3.3 million for the same year. Although Israel's trade with South Africa represented only a fraction of its total, by 1967 South Africa had become Israel's chief trading partner in Africa.

### **Volunteers in June War 67**

Whatever South African resentment remained against Israel, the June War of 1967 effectively served to minimize its expression. In an outpouring of pro-Israeli sentiment, Dr. Vorster's government not only permitted South African volunteers to work

in civilian and para-military capacities in Israel, but permission was given Zionist groups to send out more than 28 million dollars to Israel. 28) Soon Israel's new Trade Commissioner to South Africa announced that existing programs would be vastly expanded, and the South Africa Foundation, the country's most sophisticated propaganda institution, undertook to subsidize the founding of an Israeli-South African Committee. 29) One of the first activities of this body was to bring the editor of an influential Israeli daily to South Africa. In subsequent editorials it was reported that he had recommended closer political and economic ties between Israel and South Africa. That Israel should also be strengthening her developmental programs and hosting prime ministers from Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland and Malawi, states in which South African influence was all but dominant, did not go unnoticed in South Africa. These states, as South Africa expected, would hopefully play a "moderating" role between South Af-



*David Ben Gurion declares the "Proclamation of Israel" (14.5.48)*



rica and its black neighbors to the north. At the same time they would distinguish themselves as supporters of Israeli policies in United Nations debate. In short, South Africa had not only found reason to ignore certain Israeli stances, but Israel had found reason to cultivate South African friendship in practical if unspectacular ways.

#### Notes

- 1) A. Keppel-Jones, *When Smuts Goes* (Pietermaritzburg: Shuter & Shooter, 1950), pp. 31 f.
- 2) R. G. Weisbord, "Dilemma of South African Jewry", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. V (September 1967), pp. 234-35
- 3) Bernard Sachs, "South Africa: Life on a Volcano, the Jewish Community in a Castle Society", *Commentary*, Vol. IX (June 1950), p. 530
- 4) Dan Jacobson, "The Jews of South Africa: Portrait of a Flourishing Community", *Commentary*, Vol. XXIII (January 1957), p. 39
- 5) Andre Ungar, "The Abdication of a Community", *Africa South*, Vol. 3 (January-March 1959), pp. 29-30
- 6) Sachs, op. cit., p. 533
- 7) Sarah G. Millin, *The People of South Africa* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1954), p. 236
- 8) Edwin S. Munger, "Jews and the National Party" (New York: American Universities Field Services, 1956), p. 2
- 9) Weisbord, op. cit., p. 235
- 10) General Smuts, who represented the Union at the Imperial War Council, had been a supporter of Zionism from 1919. His relation with Weizmann and Zionism in South Africa are described in Gustav Saron and Louis Hotz, *The Jews in South Africa* (Cape Town, London, New York: Oxford University Press, 1955), p. 281 ff. Almost on the eve of the general election he dashed off to London to attend the seventy-fifth birthday celebration of his old friend, Dr. Chaim Weizmann. Cf. Walker, p. 788
- 11) Eric A. Walker, *A History of Southern Africa* (London, Longmans, Green and Co., 1965), p. 772
- 12) Cited in Weisbord, op. cit., p. 236
- 13) Henry Katzew, "Jews in the Land of Apartheid", *Midstream*, Vol. 8 (December 1962), p. 68
- 14) Edwin S. Munger, *Afrikaner and African Nationalism: South African Parallels and Parameters* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 20
- 15) *South African Scope*, Vol. 2, No. 6 (June 1959)
- 16) Katzew, op. cit., p. 68
- 17) *Ibid.*, p. 69, 70
- 18) *Jewish Chronicle* (London), September 2, 1960
- 19) Cited in Katzew, op. cit., p. 74
- 20) Cited in *Ibid.*, pp. 75
- 21) *Ibidem*
- 22) *Ibid.*, p. 77
- 23) Katzew, op. cit., p. 92
- 24) Moses Moskowitz to Fritz Flesch, February 13, 1959
- 25) *South African Scope*, Vol. 2, No. 8 (September 1959)
- 26) *Ibid.*, cf. Jitendra Mohan, "South Africa and the Suez Crisis", *International Journal* (Autumn 1961), Vol. 16, p. 333
- 27) South African Foundation, *Background to South African and World News*, Confidential, July 1967, p. 2
- 28) AMAX, *Summary of Press Coverage, South Africa* (August 15, 1968), p. 3
- 29) *Newsweek*, March 22, 1968

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# Settler Colonialism and Herrenfolk-democracy

Samih Farsoun

**T**he nature of South African settler colonialism historically and contemporaneously has been amply studied from varied perspectives. Less so Rhodesia. And, perhaps because of traditional Western bias, Israel even less. But, since June, 1967, and the emergence of the 'new left' internationally, Israel has been analyzed directly in those terms. 1)

The interests of the settler-colonists are in contradiction to both those of the natives and the finance capitalists of the 'mother country'. When an accommodation between the colonial power and the indigenous population begins to emerge (usually leading to political independence of the natives) the colonists are threatened and fight violently

"This highly retrograde and reactionary element led the struggle (historically) on two fronts — unyielding and wholeheartedly against the natives ... relatively and occasionally, but often very violently against the great capitalists 'back home' ". 2)

## **Independence of the Colonialists**

The colonists attempt to secede from the parent country and set up their own supremacist regime

whose hallmark is severe oppression of the natives. Rhodesia is the most recent example of this phenomenon. The violent struggle between the South African settlers and Britain while economic in essence was also related to British policy concerning the natives. When the local whites eventually won independence and control of the state, they imposed one of the most oppressive structures in history, apartheid.

"As for Israel, it is all too often forgotten that if this country represents a spearhead of imperialism in the particular present international context of antagonism between the two great blocs, this is only a result of special circumstances. Its true nature is to be a mass of small 'white' settlers spreading out more and more to colonize an under-developed territory. It is this that makes their conflict with the peoples of the region so ruthless, even where the latter live under pro-Western regimes which are themselves the satellites of imperialism. In spite of its ... alliance with American imperialism ... Israel is a secessionist colonial state. Its foundation was the object of a long and bloody struggle with England, who



*Theodor Herzl,  
founder of political zionism*

played the role of the imperialist parent country.” 3)

Upon secession or independence of the colonists, the pivotal attribute of settler colonial regimes is their relationship to the indigenous population and land. Politically, the European colonists establish what van der Berghe calls a “Herrenvolk democracy”, a political duality with parliamentary democracy for the settler colonialists and a colonial regime for the natives. This is a “parliamentary regime in which the exercise of power and suffrage is restricted, de facto, and often de jure, to the dominant group”. 4) In short, the colonists rule themselves democratically and impose their political, social and economic tyranny over the natives.

### **Land Acquisition**

A colonial settlement needs land.

Thus, an immediate antagonism erupts with the indigenous population when colonists take (conquer or even buy) the land. To secure the colony, more immigrants are needed, thus increasing the population and land pressure over the natives. Native resistance ensues. But a dynamic process is set in motion: colonist expansionism, immigration, and expulsion and/or subjugation-segregation of the natives. This dynamic process expresses itself in a series of battles and wars culminating in land control, native expulsion and subjugation. At times such conflicts become genocidal. In North America, these wars are known as the Indian Wars, in South Africa the Kaffir Wars and in the Middle East as the Arab-Israeli conflict (this is not to deny that other factors have entered into the picture here).

### **Expansionism at the Expense of the Natives**

The particulars of this dynamic process vary in the different settler-colonial situations, but the essence and end product are the same. In South Africa land acquisition was made by force supported by (and at time ignored by) the imperial power. Indeed, beginning with the 19th century, the conflict between the British imperial interests and the settler Afrikaaner community led to further wide-ranging expansionism. This expansionism was, needless to say, at the expense of the natives, first the Bushmen and Hottentots, and later, the Bantu. The Afrikaaners pushed the Black South Africans into certain lands which were “reserved” for them. The Natives Land Act of 1913

set aside for the Black natives 7 % of the territory (subsequently increased to 13 % in 1936) of South Africa, although the Africans numbered four times as many as the white Afrikaaners. This pattern was repeated in Rhodesia except that it was done in a shorter period of time, beginning in 1890 and the population ratio of African to white was nearer 20 to 1.

### **Land Acquisition through Purchases**

In the Arab world, the particulars were slightly different. Although supported by imperial Britain, early Zionist settlement in Palestine was not accomplished by conquest as it would have generated a war with a long-established empire and regional power, the Ottoman Empire. Early land acquisition by Zionists was made through purchases financed by European Zionists and sympathizers. And yet, all such activity amounted to little before the British mandate was imposed on Palestine in the wake of World War I.

The British mandate, acting in concert with the Balfour Declaration's intent of establishing a 'national homeland' for the Zionists, facilitated settler land acquisition. This set in motion a pattern of settler immigration and of dispossession of Palestine peasants. This was felt as a threat by the native Arab population who resisted in varied ways, including an all out rebellion against the British and Zionists in 1936-1939. Nonetheless, by 1947, when the British turned the Palestine question to the United Nations, Zionist and Jewish landholding in Palestine did not exceed 7 % of



*Hendrik Verwoerd*

the whole territory. 5) And yet, by 1948 settler population in Palestine had come to number close to 700,000, nearly one third the total population of the country. Wholesale Zionist land acquisition in Palestine was not accomplished until after the Palestine war of 1947-48. Here also, land acquisition was accomplished by force. It should be pointed out that the then Western dominated U. N. provided the formal basis for the Zionist settler state, without reference to the native's wishes, in a partition of Palestine resolution adopted on November 29, 1947. Apart from the Union of South Africa, only one African and one Asian nation voted for the partition plan. The resolution passed on the strength of voting of European and Western hemisphere countries.

### **Military Expansionism**

The new settler state of Israel expanded its territory in Palestine from the 56 % allocated by the U. N. to 77 % in 1948. Israeli expansionism continued further in 1967 in the wake of the June war. Territory of the rest of Palestine and of two neighboring states were conquered by Israel. Israel unilaterally annexed Arab Jerusalem and the surrounding area. Over two dozen collective and para-military settlements were established by the Israelis not only in the rest of Palestine (the West Bank) but also in Syrian and Egyptian territory.

### **Settler State Laws**

Once a settler state is erected on native land then the process of land acquisition is promulgated through settler state laws. These are statutes whose consequence is the alienation of native land and the regulation of settler acquisition. They also "legalize" such a pattern. The Absentee Property Law of 1950 in Israel is a case in point. This law and such other statutes as Article 25 of the Emergency Regulations, authorizing the military government to expel villagers and close off their areas, contributed to the transfer of Arab property into settler Israeli hands. 6) After the June 1967 war the Israeli government expropriated Arab homes inside the old city of Jerusalem, first in January and then in April, 1968. 3,000 and 5,000 Palestinians lost their land and were subsequently transferred to the East bank of the Jordan. These "legal" processes of settler acquisition of land were not different in essence or conse-

quence from the statutes and native land acts of South Africa and Rhodesia.


### **Immigration**

Together with land acquisition, settler colonialism is concerned with immigration of new settlers to help secure and strengthen the settler society. This is a thrust which is in direct contradiction to the native population. Thus, the presence of the natives is a problem. As Patrick Keatley says of white Rhodesians: "One cannot help feeling ... that in their heart of hearts, the white Rhodesians bear a wordless wish that the Africans would disappear."

The 'wordless wish' in South Africa takes the form of enforced geographical and social segregation of Blacks. Similarly, the Zionists in their rhetoric and policy exhibit this same 'wordless wish'. An early Zionist philosopher activist, Israel Zinagwill, coined the slogan that Palestine is a land without a people to be given to a people without a land (i. e. European Jews). As recently as 1969, Golda Meir, then Prime Minister of Israel, stated in an interview: "It was not as though there was a Palestinian People in Palestine considering itself as a Palestinian People and we came and threw them out and took their country away from them. They did not exist." (Sunday Times, London, June 15, 1969)


Zionist settler colonialism, fueled by religio-historical ideology and coupled with the desire to have a modern nation where there are Jews of all classes, was especially concerned with the wish for a native-free, that is Arab-free, coun-





*Allon's Westbankplan (1973)  
Israeli Palestinianans*

### *South African Bantustans*



try. In his article, Childers analyzes the history, the plans and the warfare (military, terroristic, and psychological) which made possible a Palestine, in Ben Gurion's words, "virtually emptied of its former owners." 7) Israel refused to repatriate hundreds of thousands of Palestinian Arab refugees after the 1948 war and again after the 1967 war. After the latter, a token fraction of refugees were permitted back into their homes on the West Bank. It was the unrepatriated refugees whose property was confiscated under the Absentee Property Law.

### **Biblical Justification**

Settler states facilitate immigration of qualified immigrants: White

Europeans for South Africa and Jews for Israel. The Israeli Law of return gives the right to any Jew (legally defined according to religion statutes) to settle in Israel and acquire citizenship. As with South African immigrants, are helped socially, economically and in housing. Simultaneously the citizenship laws discriminate against the native. In short, settler colonialist movements usurp native land, expel or control the natives and encourage qualified settler immigration. They justify that in terms of an ideology which includes notions that they are civilizing the native, but often such justification is Biblical. South Africa and Israel are especially strong in this.

The Dutch Reformed Church, church of the Afrikaaner settlers, relies on some Old Testament passages, held the belief that the inequality of the races is ordained by God. The Blacks, considered by the church as the descendants of Ham, are destined to serve the whites, descendants of Sham. The Boers considered the abolition of slavery as contrary to biblical precepts. 8) The Afrikaaners saw the Blacks as inferior, degraded and uncivilized. The mission of the whites is to civilize them.

The Zionists, too, depend upon Biblical passages to justify their claim to and colonization of Palestine. In addition to their function of bringing civilization to a backward Asiatic region (see T. Herzl), the Zionists saw Palestine as the promised land, given to them by God. The colonization of the country is nothing

more than reclaiming what is biblically theirs and the fulfilment of biblical prophecy. Statements of the leaders continue to speak of Eretz Israel which includes much of the present territory occupied since the 1967 war.

### **Colonial Regime for the Natives**

As van den Berghe points out, the settler colonists establish a herrenfolk democracy in which they impose on the natives — those that remain under their control — a colonial regime characterized by three major attributes:

- a) political disfranchisement and control,
- b) social segregation, and
- c) economic exploitation.

The methods of achieving political control over the natives and bringing about native disfranchisement are both direct and indirect. By virtue of the contradictory claim of parliamentary democracy, the

### *Baq'a Camp in Jordan*



settler regimes resort, most frequently, to indirect and subtle means to curb native political freedoms. In South Africa and Rhodesia where the native Black population is in the majority numerically, the right to vote is denied outright to the natives. In Israel proper where the remaining natives are in the minority (about 12 %) the right to the franchise was not denied although it was highly controlled. Freedom of expression and of association have been severely restricted through the Publications and Entertainment Act of 1963, and the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950 in South Africa. "Communism" is defined as any doctrine "which aims at bringing about any political, industrial, social or economic change within the Union by the promotion of disturbance or disorder, by unlawful acts or omissions or by

the threat of such acts or omissions." 9) Such a broad definition of the law has meant the suppression of any native activity. In 1963 alone, 7,500 publications were banned. Israeli statutes curbing native freedom of expression are more discreet but just as effective. Independent Palestinian publications in Israel are either not permitted or circumscribed and controlled. 10)

### Political Oppression

The freedom of association and political organizations of natives is also curtailed by the colonists. In South Africa the Unlawful Organization Act of 1960 (similar to an identical one in Rhodesia) and the Prohibition of Improper Interference Bill of 1966, not only empowered the authorities to declare the natives' Pan-African Congress and the African National Congress illegal, but also

### *Soweto*



*Israel Economist,  
Tel Aviv*



prohibited racial groups from participating in joint political activities. Additionally, the Law and Order Maintenance Act imposes restrictions on the freedom of association. No African can hold, address or preside a gathering except with the permission in writing of the white district commissioner. While these are declared statutes of political control of natives in South Africa, Israel uses informal but recognizable procedures to curtail independent native

Palestinian activity. All attempts at establishing independent Arab parties were frustrated by the Israeli Government. 11) Israeli techniques against native activism include arrest and imprisonment of leaders legal and other types of harassment of activists, denial of registering of associations, etc.

### **Social Segregation**

Perhaps one of the most effective mechanisms for political and social control of the natives in all

*The Star, Johannesburg*



settler colonial states including South Africa and Israel is the restriction and regulation of their freedom of movement. Such restriction is justified on a variety of grounds, including security. South African apartheid, through several laws, such as the Group Areas Act, the Bantu Urban Areas Consolidated Act, and the Bantu Law Amendment Act of 1964, restricts the natives to certain designated areas. Departure from and entry into African areas, the

reservations is strictly controlled. Africans in white areas (over three quarters of the country) travel and reside there only if they can officially show cause. This has to be done through official travel documents.

In Israel, similar restrictions are imposed on the native Palestinian Arabs. Since the creation of the State of Israel in 1948, over 80 % of Palestinian Arabs have lived, for at least a time, under military government. The laws which go-



vern these "military zones" are the State of Emergency Laws promulgated by the British Mandate in Palestine in 1945. Additional statutes, the Zones of Security Regulations, were enacted by Israel in 1949. Articles of this law give the military governors near dictatorial rights in restricting not only freedom of movement but all civil liberties. There is no recourse for the native ex-

cept higher military-administrative authorities. These laws and military government were applied to the areas of greatest native Arab population concentration Galilee, the Negev and the 'Triangle Area' in the central region of the country. This military rule lasted from 1948 until 1966, when it reverted to police control. During and since the 1967 war, military rule was reimposed in these areas,

### *Strikes in Durban 1973*



as well as in the West Bank region. These zones were not only near the Israeli border, but also in areas far from the frontier. Exit out of and entry into these 'closed zones' were by official military passes for the natives.

In 1948 Israel, Arabs who remained in urban areas were forced to move, even abandon their own property, into specified areas designated for them. This forced

ghettoization led to de facto segregation of the newly created minority native Arabs. This process along with the military governance system emerged as the basis of social segregation of the native Arabs. 12)

### **Economic Exploitation**

Of course, as in South Africa, there are token natives in certain official and institutional capaci-

### ***Demonstration in the Westbanks 1976***







ties, but these are 'safe' and 'loyal' natives. This pattern of encouraging and supporting conservative and collaborative native leadership is not unlike the pattern of South African support to Black African tribal leaders.

Finally, political and social control of the natives is allied with and necessary for economic exploitation of these people. In both South Africa and Israel the natives are concentrated in the lower occupational categories: manual, unskilled and semi-skilled occupations. Such restrictions are either a matter of practice or sometimes provided for by law. Indeed, natives in Israel are paid only a fraction of what the settlers earn for the same job. 13) The usual pattern of last-hired, first-fired is also operative here. Typically, native workers are either denied the right to organize themselves or this right is severely circumscribed. In South Africa, the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1956 defines African workers in such a manner that they are denied union organizing.

In Israel, the powerful settler union organization, the Histadrut, has had a long antagonistic history with native Arab workers. In Mandate days, the Histadrut's slogan was for Jewish work only; after the creation of the Israeli state, the new slogan was to hire 'organized workers'. As Arab workers were not unionized and were not admitted into the Histadrut, this last slogan meant denial of employment of native Arabs. In 1960, Arabs were finally admitted into the Histadrut and yet their earning power is still a fraction of that of equivalent Israeli workers.

Most of Arab labor in Israel is 'itinerant' commuting sometimes long distances for work and returning only periodically to their homes. Since 1967, nearly 70,000 Arabs from the occupied territories also commute daily into Israel for work. These Arab workers have been used as very cheap labor in Israel. 14)

### Cultural Discrimination

Similar discrimination in the educational sphere is evident. In South Africa, despite some progress, 60 % of the natives of primary school age are out of school while in Israel the rate is about 30 %. 15) Native educational institutions and facilities are distinctly inferior and suffer native cultural deprivation. According to Jiryis, native students who studied in primary schools can hardly read and write their native language. Native history is taught in a distorted manner while settler history is gloriously portrayed. 16)

In conclusion, the herrenfolk democracy the colonial settlers erected

in both South Africa and Israel is quite similar in thrust and in general features, although not in details. The similar social structures, dilemmas in handling the natives, justifications for their settlements and subsequent histories tend to bring about similar ideologies, world views and mutual sympathy.

In the wake of the Israeli vote against apartheid at the United Nations which angered the South Africans, the Die Transvaaler asked: "And is there any real difference between the way that the people of Israel are trying to maintain themselves amid non-Jewish peoples and the way the Afrikaaner is trying to remain what he is? The people of Israel base themselves upon the Old Testament to explain why they do not wish to mix with other people: the Afrikaaner does this too." 17)

#### Notes

- 1) The best example is the book by the French historian and social scientist Maxime Rodinson, *Israel: A Colonial Settler State?*, New York 1973. See also A. El-Kodsy and E. Lobel, *The Arab World and Israel*, New York 1970
- 2) A. Emmanuel, *White Settler-Colonialism and the Myth of Investment Imperialism*, in *New Left Review*, No. 73, May-June 1973, p. 39
- 3) A. Emmanuel, *op. cit.*, p. 47
- 4) *Race and Racism*, New York 1967, p. 29; see also L. van den Berghe, *South Africa, A Study in Conflict*, Middletown, Conn. 1965
- 5) See J. Ruedy, *Dynamics of Land Alienation*, in I. Abu-Lughod (ed.) *The Transformation of Palestine*, Evanstown 1971
- 6) See the account of this process in S. Jiryis (a 'native' lawyer), *The Arabs in Israel*, Beyrou 1969
- 7) *Israel Yearbook*, 1952, p. 38
- 8) See G. Jabbour, *Settler Colonialism in Southern Africa and the Middle East*, Kartoum/Beyrou 1970, p. 58
- 9) *Ibid.*, p. 67
- 10) The best illustration of this pattern is the case of Al-Ard publication. See J. Landau, *The Arabs in Israel*, London 1968, p. 96; and S. Jiryis, *op. cit.*
- 11) See J. Landau, *op. cit.*, p. 54 ff.
- 12) Evidence to illustrate this is collected by the Israeli League for Human Rights. See Israel Shahak (ed.) *The Non-Jew in the Jewish State*, Jerusalem 1975. Shahak is the Chairman of the League.
- 13) Cited in S. Jiryis, from parliamentary debates; see also Y. Ben-Porath, *The Arab Labor Force in Israel*, Jerusalem 1966; and A. Cohen, *Israel and the Arab World*, Paris 1964
- 14) S. Ryan, *Israeli Economic Policy in the Occupied Areas: Foundations of a New Imperialism*. Merip Reports No. 24, Washington/Boston, January 1974
- 15) See G. Jabbour, *op. cit.*, p. 83; S. Jiryis pp. 146 ff.
- 16) S. Jiryis, pp. 146-155
- 17) Cited in R. Stevens, *Zionism, South Africa and Apartheid: The Paradoxical Triangle*, *Palestine Essays* No. 13; Beyrou 1969, p. 25

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# Israeli Outreach into Africa

## The Development of Relations between Israel and Africa

Samih Farsoun

**T**he reasons for Israel's effort to establish relations with sub-Saharan Africa, analysed by both sympathizers to and critics of Israel, include diplomatic, strategic and economic considerations. Israel, according to these analysts, attempted to break out of the strategic isolation and encirclement by the antagonist Arab world, to develop markets for its goods and services in order to reduce or break the Arab economic boycott, to enlist African diplomatic support, and to line up votes for its side at the rapidly changing United Nations. 1)

The Bandung Conference resolutions denounced Israel and affirmed the rights of the Palestinian people. This stimulated Israeli concern in a changing international situation. To Israeli policy-makers, the nation's security was at stake. Here, it should suffice to point out the Knesset statement of Golda Meir, then Foreign Minister, upon her return from a trip to Africa in 1958: We cannot limit our friendship to Europe and America especially that two thirds of the members of the United Nations are developing countries. Thus, it is natural that Israel seeks to gain support of the rest

of the world; the goal of our relations to the new states is to affirm and strengthen our position in the new world. (Jerusalem Post, April 1, 1958)

Similarly, David Ben Gurion said in 1960 in a Knesset speech that the African states are not strong but their voice is heard throughout the world and their votes in international organizations are of equal value to those of the great powers. The goal of Israeli African friendship at worst is to neutralize Africa from the Arab-Israeli conflict, and at best to secure African support for the Israeli position. (The Economist, August 27, 1960) Furthermore, Ben Gurion, quoted in the Israel Yearbook (1960/1965, p. 39), stated that national security is the central point around which Israeli foreign policy rests. An aspect of this policy is to establish friendly relations with all states especially in Asia and Africa.

### Pioneer-Image

Israel presented itself to Africa as a small country belonging neither to the capitalist West nor the Communist East; as self-reliant, making it a model for rapid development and progress; and as an example of true demo-

cracy and socialism. 2) Reinforcing this ideological contention was the newly independent African countries' sensitivity toward their former European colonists. Thus, these countries more readily turned toward Israel for capital, skilled manpower and technical aid. In some case, Israel's position was facilitated by existing consular and trade agreements carried over from the colonial period. 3) So rapid was this development that by 1963 Israel had more diplomatic missions in Africa than all other countries except Britain, France and the United States.

Between 1960 and the early 1970's, Israel built up strong and wide-ranging relations with sub-Saharan Africa. The nature and scope of these relations are summarized in the statistical tables 1 and 2 in the appendix below. Here we shall review only the salient aspects. Trade relations between Israel and the African continent rose from almost nothing in the late 1950's to 72 million dollars in 1971. Israeli exports rose from 10.5 million dollars in 1960 to 47.5 million dollars in 1971. Israeli imports from Africa, however, only rose moderately in the same period, from 18 million dollars to 25.5 million dollars. It should be noted that South Africa has the largest share of this trade: 8,080,000 dollars of Israeli imports from Africa out of a total of 25,211,000 dollars, or 32.1 %; and 9,398,000 dollars in exports out of a total of 47,421,000 dollars to Africa, or 19.8 %. It should also be noted that the strongest trade relations between Israel and Africa tended to exist with sub-Saharan states most closely tied to and allied

with Western capitalist interests: South Africa, Liberia, Ethiopia, Central African Republic, Kenya and Uganda. These trade figures do not adequately reflect the scope of Israeli economic interests in Africa. Important are the activities of Israeli industrial, design and consulting companies whose contracts total hundreds of millions of dollars.

### Joint-ventures

Vered, the water resources development company, had nearly 100 million dollars in contracts by 1970 and employed nearly 10,000 Afri-

### Countries with which Israel has signed Cooperation Agreements

Burundi	1962
Cameroon	1962
Central African Republic	1964
Chad	1964
Benin	1961
Gabun	1962
Ghana	1962, 1973
Ivory Coast	1962
Kenya	1966
Liberia	1962
Madagascar	1964
Mali	1969
Niger	1963
Rwanda	1962
Sierra Leone	1965
Tanzania	1963
Togo	1964
Uganda	1963
Upper Volta	1961
Zaire	1964

*Source: Division of  
International Cooperation*

### Israel's Foreign Youth Projects, 1972

Activity	Africa (13)	Latin America (7)	Totals (20)
National service, training and settlements	Ivory Coast, Dahomey	Ecuador, Colombia	4
Agricultural training to soldiers	—	Bolivia	1
National youth movement — mainly rural and in agriculture	Malawi, Swaziland, Cameroun*, Togo, Chad **	—	5
National youth movement — mainly educational	Liberia, Niger **	Costa Rica, Panama, El Salvador, Venezuela	6
National youth movement — education and vocational training	Rwanda, Gabon, Lesotho	—	3
Specialized programs	Senegal	—	1

\* *An additional project is the Centre for the Training of Youth Leaders.*

\*\* *Discontinued, after the rupture of diplomatic relations.*

*Source: Division of International Cooperation, 1973*

cans in Nigeria, Niger, Sierra Leone and Kenya. Other companies with interests and investments in Africa include chemical, agricultural development, industrial planning and asbestos cement enterprises.

Perhaps most successful of Israeli efforts were participation in joint African-Israeli companies and projects. In addition to profits, these enterprises employed 500 Israeli experts on a yearly average. Between 1957 and 1963, Israel had entered into joint partnership in 42 African companies worth 200 million dollars. By 1966, Israel had become involved in nearly 200 companies worth 500 million dollars. 4) The most involved

of these partnerships were the projects of Solel Boneh, however, a celebrated example of such enterprises is the Black Star shipping lines of Ghana. Israel's own shipping line, Zim, owned 40 % of the Black Star line while the Ghana Government owned 60 %. Israel had supplied as well the technical know-how. This was a typical pattern in which the capital scarce Israel made and controlled many profitable African investments.

#### Technical aid

In 1960, Israel had signed only one technical aid agreement in Africa, but by 1971, the number had risen to 24. However, most

interesting of the relationships with the African states, the Israeli technical aid programs to Africa are of three varieties: African training in Israel, Israeli experts working in, and institutions of technical training in Africa. Between 1958 and 1969, 6,272 Africans were trained in Israel. This was nearly half of the total number of people trained in Israel in the same period. It should be noted that the field with the largest trainees was union and cooperative leadership. Israel also sent, between 1958 and 1970, nearly two thirds of its foreign aid technical experts — 2,483 out of 3,948 — to Africa. The field in which most Israelis experts worked was youth organizations followed by agriculture. This was in part related to the cooperative and settlement institutions which Israel, with Western encouragement and support, attempted to export. The-

se were para-military institutions styled after the Gadna, youth battalions, and Nahal, the militant youthful organizations of Israel. In Israel itself, several institutions were created to further such aid. Prominent among these is the important Afro-Asian Institute for Labor Studies and Cooperation in Tel Aviv.

### Military aid

Finally, Israel has provided military experts and advisers to African armies and governments, and has trained African military officers and police on its own soil. Fifteen African countries have been involved in this effort. Israel established and administered flight, naval and police academies in Ghana, and many Israeli officers have served on the staff of the military and police academies of Ethiopia. And since 1966, and until 1973, Israel had full responsi-

### Foreign Trainees in Israel, 1958-1971

Continent	1958-65	1966-71	Total
Africa	3.552	3.245	6.797
Asia	.946	1.923	2.869
Mediterranean	1.918	1.151	3.069
Latin America	1.052	1.471	2.523
Total			15.258

*Note: The figures refer to trainees who came to Israel to attend courses, study tours, and seminars, or for individual studies, of various duration, organized, assisted or with other forms of official participation of the Division of International Cooperation. They do not include students or research fellows invited directly by academic or other institutions, without participation of the Division. The figures represent a cumulative addition of data on the basis of yearly computation.*

*Source: Division of International Cooperation, 1973*

bility for military training in Uganda. President Idi Amin of Uganda and General Mobutu of Zaire received training in Israel. In 1965, the Defense Ministry of Sierra Leone announced that Israel agreed to supply experts to train its army. Most critical of all, Israeli military advisers had been active in Chad and Ethiopia in counter-insurgency operations against the National Liberation Front of Chad (Afrique-Asie, July 20, 1970) and the Eritrean Liberation Front of Ethiopia.

### **Collaboration with CIA**

Israel has maintained in Africa an extensive intelligence operations network. The best known Israeli effort is the one centered in Asmara, Eritrea. The Africa Research Group notes that Israeli covert operations "are tied into larger CIA and Western intelligence operation." 6)

During the 1960's, Israel sold military equipment, especially Uzzi submachine guns to many African countries, particularly those closely tied to Western interests. Israel equipment and training stress elite troops and strike forces which are effective against guerilla and "insurgent", i. e. revolutionary, forces. In this, Israel has been playing a complementary role to the more extensive programs of counter-revolution developed by the United States. This was especially useful in a continent in which the U. S. attempted to keep a 'low profile'. Both South Africa and the U. S. (as well as other ex-colonial European powers) were not only accepting but were actively supportive of Israel's Africa efforts. They saw such efforts as contribution to the struggle

against African national liberation and revolutionary ("international communism") movements which threaten both their separate and complimentary interests. 7)

### **David and Goliath in Africa**

This is the title of an article which best conveys the internationally linked counter-revolutionary and anti-communist effort of Israel and the U. S. in Africa. A similar thrust with different methods also exists between the U. S. and South Africa (despite some official U. S. criticisms of apartheid) in both South Africa and its Black dependencies in the southern part of the continent. 8) These parallel pattern of collaboration linked to the U. S. are in fact parts of a triangular complex which indirectly links Israel and South Africa. The latter two countries occupy similar positions and play similar roles in the context of international capitalism, particularly U. S. imperialism in Africa.

Both have been active in the military and intelligence fields against African revolutionaries in their respective African regions. South Africa has intervened in various ways, including military actions in Rhodesia. Israel, in addition, has played a significant role in ideological and organizational counter-revolutionary efforts in Africa.

### **"Third Force"**

Arnold Rivkin, a U. S. brain trust researcher and, before he died, head of the Africa Project at M. I. T., wrote in 1959 that Israel's moderate form of socialist development could serve as an important example to developing nations rebelling against the West:





*"The Israeli model may well prove to be a sort of economic 'third force' — an alternative differing from the Western pattern, but certainly far more compatible with free-world interests than any communist model."* 9)

He further notes:

*"Israel's role as a third force might also be reinforced by imaginative use of the third country technique. A free world state wishing to enlarge its assistance flow to Africa might channel some part of it through Israel because of Israel's special qualifications and demonstrated acceptability to many African nations."* 10)

Rivkin's proposals not only reflected ongoing policy but also encouraged it further. U. S. covert action programs had been channeling funds and know-how to 'third

forces' ever since the Cold War broke out.

In Africa, much Israeli activity was underwritten by the U. S. and to a lesser extent the European capitalist countries.

*"France has assisted youth projects in the Ivory Coast; and Great Britain and West Germany have reportedly given assistance to projects elsewhere in Africa."*

*Israel's achievement in having more than half its effort financed from non-Israeli sources is probably unique in the tangled history of postwar technical assistance operations."* 11)

While not all of the funds for these programs come directly from Western sources, some are derived from African host countries who themselves have received Western 'aid'. It is these 'aid' pro-

### Israeli Experts Abroad on Bilateral Projects, 1958-1971

Continent	1958-65	1966-71	Total
Africa	1,078	1,685	2,763
Asia	154	334	488
Mediterranean	159	288	447
Latin America	107	536	643
Total			4,341

*Note: The figures refer to experts who served abroad, on both long- and short-term assignments. They represent a cumulative addition of data on the basis of yearly computation.*

*Source: Division of International Cooperation, 1973*

grams that have been one of the most efficient methods of creating dependence on the donor country. L. Laufer notes: *"It is probably more than a coincidence that the greatest increase have been in exports to those African countries (for example, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and Uganda) that also have an active technical cooperation program with Israel "* 12)

#### Training Union Leaders

Most interesting of the U. S.-Israel (and Europe-Israel) areas of collaboration using the 'third-force' technique involve training African union leaders and organizers. The Israeli Afro-Asian Institute for Labor Studies and Cooperation which has been the principal institution of labor leaders training was launched in the early 1960's with an AFL-CIO (American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations) grant of 60,000 dollars. In addition, it received between 1960 and 1962 over 300,000 dollars in grants and scholarships from the same AFL-CIO and the latter's affiliate, the

British Trade Union (BTU). Various sources have since revealed that the international labor programs of the AFL-CIO have been integrated with and infiltrated by the CIA. The thrust of the AFL-CIO international programs is parallel to and integrated with the CIA international labor strategy. 13)

In short, the Israeli labor leader training institute is specifically training apolitical and anti-communist African trade union leadership. The Africa Research Group writes: *"African trade unions are highly political instruments and the training which takes place in Israel seeks to depoliticize them pushing a 'cooperative' orientation rather than a working class, revolutionary one."* 14)

Israeli actions and Israel's imperialist function in Africa earned on the one hand, the support of South Africa and the capitalist West. On the other, as such actions and role were progressively exposed, they earned the hostility of Black Africa which was becoming increasingly anti-imperia-

list (especially in world forums) and hostile to apartheid in South Africa and white minority rule in Rhodesia.

### **Israel, Apartheid and Africa**

Israel's balancing act foundered in 1973 and transformed itself since then into an above-board alliance with reactionary African regimes, especially South Africa. However, this alliance was not sudden and was not devoid of past turbulence. The thrust of Israel into Black Africa since the 1960's sowed the seeds of conflict in its relations with South Africa up to 1973. These were the years of Israeli success in the Black continent. The wedge which widened the gap of contradictions between African states and Israel and drew Israel closer to South Africa was the Israeli position on a number of African questions. These were the African causes of national liberation, anti-white minority rule and anti-apartheid.

In the eyes of Black Africans, the pattern of Israeli actions progressively became clear and confirmed Israel's linkage to im-


perialism and local reactionary forces. For example, Israel voted against Algerian independence in the U. N. in 1965, and against the U. N. program to hold general elections in Cameroon in 1959. Israel also voted against censuring France's explosion of a nuclear device in the Sahara. In 1960, Israel abstained in voting for the independence of Tanganyika, Ruanda and Burundi, only one year after it voted against the Liberian proposal to grant self-rule to African colonies.

Israel's support of secessionist movements in Africa also earned her some enmity. Israel supported Biafra in Nigeria 15) which led several Nigerian papers to call on the Nigerian government to reconsider its relation with Israel. On the Congo crisis, Israel took an ambivalent stand. Africans came to know of the Thomas Tshombe, brother of Moise Tshombe, leader of the Katanga movement, visit to Israel during which he stated that he discussed with Israeli officials the recognition of an independent Katanga. 16) Also, Israel abstained from voting for seating

### **African Trainees in Israel, 1972**

Agriculture	105
Rural society and regional planning	13
Cooperatives and labor	80
Science and technology	48
Administration and public services	38
Community development and education	85
Medicine and public health	27
Youth	9
Total	402

*Source: Division of International Cooperation, 1973*



the Congolese delegation at the U. N. Israel actively supported secessionist activities in southern Sudan.

A most critical aspect of Israeli actions in Africa has been Israel's collaboration with the Portuguese effort to maintain its colonial rule in Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Angola. The great Guinean revolutionary leader, the late Amilcar Cabral specifically pointed out Israel's training of, and armaments supply to Portuguese troops conducting a colonial war against the African peoples. Also, he noted

Israeli training of counter-revolutionary Guinean elements to infiltrate the revolutionary ranks. He denounced the alliance of Portugal, Israel and the U.S. 17)

*"In a statement, Louis Cabral (brother of Amilcar) of the political bureau of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) said 'regarding the role played by the U. S. imperialists, Zionism and NATO in support of Portugal, I would like to remind you ... that most of the arms of the Portuguese are Israeli'."* 18)

Such Israeli activity in Africa was not unknown to the South African government which supported all anti-liberation and counter-revolutionary efforts in Africa. Indeed, in July, 1967, shortly after the June war of that year, the South African labor minister stated that the failure of the Arabs to defeat Israel strengthens the position of South Africa for it will make the extremist African leaders reconsider their threats against the government of South Africa.

The Israel-South Africa accord, however, became disrupted as early as 1961, when after abstaining in the U. N. vote the previous year, Israel voted in November of that year on the side of special proposals to impose economic sanctions on South Africa's apartheid regime. This may have been a vote Israel could hardly ignore given her wish to establish relations with Black African states.

The South African government reacted angrily, and Verwoerd declared that if Israel sees fault with South Africa's policies then the continuity of Israel in the Arab world is also at fault (quoted in S. Mansoor, 1966, cited in A. Abdul-Rahman). Nevertheless, despite this and despite the above-mentioned U. N. General Assembly resolution calling on member states to break relations with South Africa, to boycott its goods and to refrain from exporting goods to it, Israeli-South African trade and economic relations grew rapidly and came to be the largest share of the Israel-Africa trade. And, again, despite an Israeli speech in November 1967 at the U. N. attacking apartheid publically, organizations in each country pressed

for closer and improved relations between the two countries.

Als Sulzberger concludes: *"The basic truth remains that this country (South Africa), which has few friends abroad, regards Israel as one of them. For some time Israel's policy of cultivating black*

### Breaking off of Diplomatic Relations with Israel

Guinea	6.6.1967
Uganda	30.3.1972
Chad	28.11.1972
Kongo	5.12.1972
Niger	10.12.1972
Mali	5.1.1973
Burundi	16.5.1973
Togo	21.9.1973
Zaire	4.10.1973
Benin	6.10.1973
Rwanda	9.10.1973
Upper Volta	11.10.1973
Kamerun	15.10.1973
Equatorial Guinea	15.10.1973
Tanzania	18.10.1973
Madagascar	20.10.1973
Centralafrican Republic	21.10.1973
Ethiopia	23.10.1973
Nigeria	25.10.1973
Gambia	26.10.1973
Zambia	26.10.1973
Ghana	28.10.1973
Senegal	28.10.1973
Gabon	30.10.1973
Sierra Leone	30.10.1973
Kenya	1.11.1973
Liberia	2.11.1973
Ivory Coast	8.11.1973
Botswana	13.11.1973

*African nations was resented. Now this has been forgotten in the belief that Israel's stand against Russia and Russian proxies at this continent's extreme north helps prepare a position for similar stand, if need be, when the day for such comes to the extreme south."* (New York Times, April 30, 1971)

A similar stand, that is, against any anti-imperialist national liberation struggle.

### **Donation to the OAU**

In 1969, Israel must have felt secure enough in Africa to abstain from voting in the U. N. on resolutions censuring and imposing economic and military sanctions against the white minority regime

of Rhodesia, the ally of South Africa. This again raised questions among Black African states. And yet, the last wrinkle to occur in the South Africa-Israel accord before 1973 was in connection with the U Thant call in 1971 upon countries who oppose colonialism and racism to make contributions to the African Liberation Committee through the OAU. Israel pledged I. L. 10,000. Although this pledge was rejected by the liberation committee — on the grounds that Israel itself is a racist and colonial country whose objective is to increase its infiltration of Black Africa for the benefit of imperialism — South Africa was angered and responded by restricting monetary transfers to Israel. Israel quickly explained

*Premier Rabin and President Ford*



that such funds were not for the liberation movements but for the U. N.'s Commission for refugees' education fund.

The dilemma of Israeli politics was that it could not at the same time fight the Arab boycott against Israel and support the African boycott against South Africa, the latter being the crucial question for Africans. Contrary to widespread opinion that Africa broke relations with Israel under the pressure of the oil-boycott, this process had started much earlier (see table). It was initiated by the resolutions of the OAU esp. the OAU summit conference in May 1973, when sanctions were announced as long as Israel would not withdraw from the occupied territories.



#### Notes

- 1) See L. Laufer, *Israel and the Developing Countries*, New York 1968; and A. Abdul Rahman, *Israel wa Ifriqiya 1948-1973 (Israel and Africa 1948-1973)*, Bey-rout 1974
- 2) L. Laufer op. cit.; and A. Rivkin: *Africa and the West*, New York 1961
- 3) A. Abdul Rahman, op. cit., p. 35
- 4) S. Decalo, cited in A. Abdul Rahman, op. cit., p. 71
- 5) Ibid. p. 77
- 6) Africa Research Group, *David and Goliath Collaborate in Africa*, in *Leviathan*, September 1975, p. 14
- 7) See M. Klare, *War without End*, New York 1972; and S. Smith, *US-Neocolonialism in Africa*, New York 1974; and Laufer, L., op. cit.
- 8) See H. S. Rogers, *Imperialism in Africa*, in: *The Black Scholar*, January 1972
- 9) Cited in Africa Research Group op. cit., p. 2
- 10) A. Rivkin: op. cit., p. 89
- 11) L. Laufer, op. cit., p. 50 and p. 62
- 12) Ibid., p. 211
- 13) See Ph. Agee, *Inside the Company: CIA Diary*. London 1975, for a detailed discussion of CIA labor strategy in Latin America esp. Appendix I; for listings of CIA affiliated international labor organizations, G. Morris, *The CIA and American Labor*. New York 1968. Dowd, D. *The Twisted Dream*, Cambridge(Mass.) 1974
- 14) Africa Research Group, op. cit., p. 6
- 15) H. S. Rogers, op. cit., p. 42
- 16) *Middle East Record* 1960, pp. 36, 37, cited in A. Abdul Rahman op. cit.
- 17) *Daily Standard of Tanzania*, October 7, 1972, cited in A. Abdul Rahman, p. 102
- 18) cited in Rogers, op. cit., p. 41

*Tables from: Amir, Sh.: Israel's Development Cooperation with Africa, Asia and Latin America*, New York (Praeger), 1974



# Military-economic Collusion

Birgit Sommer

The year 1967 was decisive for the development of the relationship between Israel and the Republic of South Africa. On the one hand, Israel's war of aggression and its policy of annexation resulted in the demolition of the political basis of its relations with Black Africa, on the other, Israel after the June war initiated an economic policy of enforced export of goods in which South Africa has acquired a clearly defined function.

This economic policy aimed at a cut in the trade and balance of payments deficit through export promotion and import of capital as well as at industrialisation in order to substitute imports, which included among other measures the speeded-up set-up of an Israeli war production. Of no little consequence regarding the essential pre-requisite for the implementation of this strategy was the June war 1967: it brought improvements in the infra-structure and the road-system through the annexation, expansion of the raw material basis (e. g. Sinai oil), acquirement of an additional labour force in Gaza and the West Banks.

This economic strategy was reflected in a wide range of measures for the promotion of exports and an investment promotion bill

which created very favourable conditions indeed for foreign capital (Israel's Außenhandel, Tel Aviv/Frankfurt, Oct. 1971).

Even during the period of restricted diplomatic relations in the 1960s, economic exchange with South Africa had been growing steadily. This can be seen not only in the development of the volume of foreign trade (see table) but also in the development of capital transfer relations which only became known gradually (see p. ). The South African foreign currency and capital exports regulations were made subject to special exemptions in the case of Israel,

The Zionist League after the break-off of diplomatic relations in 1962 replaced the missing diplomatic apparatus extraordinarily well. Prominent Israeli politicians travelled to South Africa at the invitation of the Zionistische Organisations of South Africa or the Board of Deputies and had opportunity to meet South African politicians there — while the same contracts were made in the other direction as well. In May 1969 Ben Gurion visits South Africa on a fund raising tour and among other people meets President Vorster. In May 1973 it is Yitzak Rabin, then not yet Premier, who visits

South Africa for the same purpose. In September 1973 the South African Minister of Interior Mulder goes to Israel on a private visit, meeting among others Abba Eban, while Moshe Dayan follows an invitation to South Africa by the South African Foundation. And these are only the more prominent visitors. 1)

### **The "Millionaires' Conferences"**

Since 1968 the ground was prepared for the foundation of other organisations for the development of Israeli-South African relations: in May 1968 the first so-called "Millionaires' Conference" takes place in Israel (the second in 1973) the object of which is to convince Jewish and other capitalists from all over the world to invest in Israel. The Israel Corporation, founded as a holding company as a result of this conference was to provide 100 Mio. Dollars for investment in Israel. The conference has a regional committee for South Africa, and South Africans subscribe for considerable shares of the Israel Corporation. 2)

February 1968 had already seen the foundation of the Israeli-South African Friendship Society one of the aims of which was the restoration of full diplomatic relations: the South Africa Foundation constitutes an Israeli-South African Man-To-Man Committee (Sechaba, April 1970). Towards the end of 1967 Harry Voremborg visited South Africa as "semi-official representative" of the Israeli Ministry of Commerce and Industry in order to study the possibilities for the improvement of trade relations (Blick durch die Wirtschaft, 24.1.1968). Towards the

end of 1968 a South African-Israeli chamber of commerce was founded, the ISATA (Israeli-South African Trade Organisation), which began to hold "Israel Weeks" in South African chain-stores, consequently improving the export volume of the Israeli textile and food industries.

### **Israel's Export Drive**

'To be an exporter anywhere these days is to be a VIP; to be one in Israel, it is to be a hero' writes the Johannesburg Financial Mail (Sep. 1971) about the Israeli measures for export promotion — extremely cheap credits (6 % instead of 15 to 16 %), tax benefits, refunding of travelling expenses in exporting firms, promotion of participation in trade fairs, exhibitions, etc.

All the measures gave a tremendous boost to the Israeli-South African trade. In April 1974 Israel took part as an exhibitor in the "Rand Show" — the first official Israeli exhibition in South Africa (Israel Economist, April 1974) — and the Israeli pavillion promptly won a gold medal. On the other hand, a South African chemical importing firm gained recognition as a "Certified Exporter", a title awarded yearly (Israel Industry and Commerce and Export News, June 1974). The export data, moreover, do not even contain a vital item of South African-Israeli exchange of goods — the trade of diamonds which is effected through the diamond syndicate monopolised by de Beers. The export of cut diamonds is the largest single item in Israel's export statistics and the better part of the uncut diamond imports

## Foreign Trade RSA - Israel

### Israel's exports to the RSA by selected groups of commodities

	<i>Million Dollars</i>	
	1973	1974
<b>Industrial exports</b>	11,3	27,7
thereof		
chemicals, medicaments, paints	3,4	11,2
foods, beverages, tobacco	1,1	1,8
textiles, clothing and leather	3,3	7,6
polished diamonds	0,5	0,4
metal-processing industry and others	3,0	6,7
<b>agricultural products</b>	0,7	1,0
<b>total exports</b>	12,0	28,7

### Israel's imports from the RSA by economic destination

	1973	1974
investment goods	0,0	0,2
production inputs (raw materials)	23,3	35,6
consumer goods		
durable	0,0	0,0
non-durable	4,2	2,6
<b>total</b>	27,5	38,4

*Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel 1975, No. 26,  
Central Bureau of Statistics*

handled by the Central Sales Agency originates from South Africa.<sup>3)</sup>

### October 1973

The October war and its economic consequences lead to a further intensification of economic relations. South Africa — together with Iran, Australia and several Far Eastern and Latin American countries — is declared an "export target country" of the Israeli export development agencies. In spite of the overwhelming sympathy for the Israelis expressed in South Africa during the October war, the South African "realpolitik" tried to detract from

the expansion of this relationship while the Israelis, with the breakdown of their Africa policy, themselves became more publicity-minded.

The continuing economic crisis after the October war and the balance of payments situation caused the Israeli government to further improve the investment conditions for foreign capital — a policy of cutting on real wages is devised to make Israel even more competitive in the world market.

**"... we can really go places  
if we join forces."**

"With South Africa's abundance

of raw materials and Israel's know-how, we can really go places if we join forces." (Financial Mail, June 1974)

This quotation by Itzhak Unna, Israel's ambassador to South Africa, characterizes well the basic structure of South African-Israeli economic relations.

There can be no doubt that the actual volume of the cooperation in the weapons industry between Israel and South Africa is much larger than officially admitted. Both countries always stress their different military requirements, as did Premier Vorster on the occasion of his visit to Israel. As a matter of fact, however, the possibilities for cooperation between both countries are considerable and everything points at their utilisation. The South African Air Force, for example, is equipped with Mirage fighters and the South African

Atlas Aircraft Corporation is planning to build a version of the Mirage F 1 in licence, beginning in 1977. (Africa Contemporary Record 1973-1974, p. B 437)

Israel also acquired a squadron of Mirage fighters between 1962 and 1964. "Worth mentioning is the fact that the I. A. I. (Israel Aircraft Industries) is commissioned to overhaul, repair, retrofit and test all aircraft of the Israeli Air Force. Similar services are also provided for a number of owners of transport aircraft and for certain foreign airforces." (Israels Außenhandel, March 1976) It is virtually certain that the South African Air Force is one of these customers. The advantages of such an agreement are that servicing costs usually are lower than those of the producer — also in the case of Israel — and furthermore that they do not have to be paid for in a hard currency.

### Foreign Trade Israel - South Africa

	Israel's Exports			Israel's Imports		
	(1) to SAR	(2) to Africa	(3) (1) in % of (2)	(4) from SAR	(5) from Africa	(6) (4) in % of (5)
1967	4,0	—	—	3,4	—	—
1968	5,7	—	—	5,2	—	—
1969	8,2	34,2	24 %	4,6	31,2	15 %
1970	10,7	41,6	26 %	10,2	30,1	34 %
1971	9,4	—	—	8,2	—	—
1972	8,3	46,2	19 %	11,6	31,9	36 %
1973	12,0	42,7	28 %	27,5	56,6	49 %
1974	28,7	69,7	41 %	38,4	85,9	45 %
1975	35,0	—	—	38,0	—	—

Sources: Israels Außenhandel, August 1971; Israel Export and Trade Journal May/June 1975; Statistical Abstract of Israel 1975, No. 26; Central Bureau of Statistics, Jerusalem Post, March 2, 1976

## Israel Disposes of the Nuclear Bomb

What until now had often been qualified as pure speculation turned out to be a hard fact: Israel disposes of the atomic bomb, more precisely of thirteen, with each having an explosive capacity of 20 KT equivalent those bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. These bombs can be dropped at any time by Kfir or Phantom specially fitted for strikes with A-bombs.

US-experts have in the meantime found out how Israel came to possess these bombs. They were hastily prepared in a subterranean tunnel during the first days of the Yom Kippur War when the first Israeli counter attacks on the Suez Front were bloodily repelled by the Egyptians and when Israel troops had to draw back on the Golan Heights due to Syrian tank attacks. Only the turning of the fortune of war in favour of the Israelis finally stopped the sortie of A-bombs. It can be taken for granted that the SU knows about the Israeli bombs. It was them who shipped nuclear war heads from Nikolajew on the Black Sea to Alexandria on October 13, 1973, where they were to be mounted on SCUD missiles already stationed there. When the American spotted the Soviet Vessel carrying the bombs through the Bosphorus on 15 October, they warned Moscow

by calling a military alert. The americans learned of the Israeli bombs by a reconnaissance flight of a SR-71 plane (Blackbird). Two Israeli Phantoms were instructed to shoot down this plane but they could not reach the 85,000 feet flying height of the Blackbird, which made an easy escape.

The origins of the Israeli A-bomb go back to the times of Israel's first President Chaim Weizman, himself an expert in chemistry with an international reputation, he encouraged his scientists to try on the bomb. They produced Uranium from Phosphate in the Negev desert and developed the technology to produce heavy water. In exchange of their knowledge they were allowed to study France's nuclear programm as well as to take part in the tests in the Sahara in 1953. Four years later Israel received its first reactor from France. France was later giving a helpful hand in the erection of the nuclear research center Dimona in the Negev desert. Dimona's first reactor was operating in 1964. It was camouflaged by Prime Minister Ben Gurion as a textile plant.

Despite the veto of Israel's National Security Council Premier Levi Eshkol, who himself opposed the A-bomb, he had to find out that the Minister of Defence, Moshe Dayan,

## TO A JEWISH FRIEND

Don't ask me  
the impossible  
Don't ask me  
to hunt stars,  
walk to the sun.  
Don't ask me  
to empty the sea  
to erase the day's light  
I am nothing but a man.

Don't ask me  
to abandon my eyes, my love,  
the memory of my childhood.

I was raised  
under an olive tree,  
I ate the figs  
of my orchard  
drank wine from  
the sloping vineyards  
Tasted Cactus fruit  
in the valleys  
more, more.

The nightingale has sung  
in my ears  
The free winds of fields and cities  
always tickled me  
My friend  
You cannot ask me  
to leave my own country.

*March 1971*  
*By Fouzi El Asmar from*  
*'Poems from an Israeli prison'.*

had ordered the building under the strictest secrecy, and that he could only sign a project already under way. Dayan believed that Israel had „no choice” in its situation. According to his view Israel's manpower would in the long run not be sufficient physically, financially and economically to man more and more tanks and planes: “Soon we shall only be able to lubricate them”.

Western experts believe to know that already in 1963 Israel made a subterranean test in the Negev and that soon afterwards preparations of A-bomb-materials started. In 1969 everything was settled but production of the bomb did not start right away. Israel's scientists rather concentrated on the development of new methods to shorten cut production time of the bomb. Dimona in the Negev is not only guarded by troops, but also has a highly developed electronic system and radar screens, working around the clock. It is strictly forbidden to all planes, including Israeli war planes to fly over the area. During the Six Days War an Israeli Mirage III went astray in the area. The plane was brought down mercilessly by an antiaircraft missile fired by their own people. When in 1973 a Libyan civilisation plane inadvertently approached the area Israeli fighters tried to force the plane to change course. When this proved to be of no result the plane was shot down. 108 out of 113 passengers were killed.


*Wehrtechnik, June 1976*  
*Wehrtechnik is a renowned semi-official military magazine.*

### Jet Fighter Kfir

In respect to the production plans of the Atlas Aircraft Corporation the Israelis can contribute their experience with the construction of the "Kfir" produced by I. A. I.: the Kfir has been developed since 1969 out of the Mirage III and V. The procuring of the Mirage blueprints by espionage through Switzerland made headlines in 1969. In the meantime the tactical aircraft is produced with an engine supplied from the United States and is also sold; it is speculated that South Africa is among the buyers. In any case, Israel is forced to export. In January the I. A. I. made public that orders placed by foreign corporations and governments had doubled, amounting to some 100 mio. dollars in 1976/77. The Jerusalem Post (January 6, 1976) writes that the export drive had been necessary in order to balance cuts in the acquisition programme of the Ministry of Defence — the impending dismissal of 3,000 out of 18,000 workers could only be avoided through working to capacity provided by export orders. This is the classical argument for the implementation of politically controversial export licences. The I. A. I. describes its clientele thus: "10 medium-sized countries not too committed buy military hardware" (Jerusalem Post, January 6, 1976), and among the clients of the I. A. I. subsidiary company Elta Electronics Ltd. are several Western countries "among them NATO-affiliated and Latin American countries." (Israel Economist, Aug./Sep. 1975)

### Financing Problems

One of the main problems for Israel whose armament supplies are competitive costwise is the financing of the imports of the targeted Asian and Latin American countries which suffer from severe currency stringency. Israel cannot compete with the big arms dealers like the United States, France,




*Premier Rabin and Jet-fighter Kfir*



etc.: long-range pre-financing is not in the interest of the Israeli economy for following the Financial Times (February 20, 1976) "one of the main reasons for the current emphasis on overseas sales of the Kfir is to provide the foreign exchange with which to pay for the advanced aeronautical developments I. A. I. has in mind."

Thus, while there can scarcely be any doubt that Israel is offering the Kfir and other armament supplies to South Africa, there remains the question whether South Africa is willing to conclude such a spectacular arms deal with a country like Israel. Fears that amicable relations with Israel might endanger the oil sup-



plies on which South Africa heavily depends, do not seem to be too strong. The reason for this can be found to some extent in the friendly relationship of South Africa with Iran (see 3. Welt-Magazin 3/4, 1976, p. 76) which supplies 30 % of the South African oil imports and which did not follow the oil boycott being Israel's most important supplier of oil.

### **The Reshef Patrol-Boats**

The case of the licenced production of patrol-boats of the Reshef class might give a hint for the possible cooperation in the aircraft production. The naval manual "Flottes de Combat" 4) names Haifa and Durban as the shipyards and considering the present state of development of the South African shipbuilding industry it is reasonable to assume that vital components are not being produced in South Africa. "Licenced production" thus seems to be a less incriminating term than ordinary export.


Israel itself also cannot produce highly sophisticated armament goods without important supplies from abroad. The Reshef patrol-boat is such a case; it shows how political difficulties are avoided in the international arms trade. The Reshef is a patrol-boat of the "Saar IV"-class, designed by the Lürssen Werft of Bremen. According to Janes Fighting Ships (1976, p. 186) "political problems caused their building in France instead of Germany". When France imposed an arms embargo on Israel after the June war, five of the twelve boats ordered still had to be delivered and remained berthed in Cherbourg from where the Israeli Secret Service "ab-

ducted" them most spectacularly Christmas 1969. The long passage to Haifa is today used as a sales argument for the "remarkable endurance of this class." Israel reproduced these boats in Haifa; the short period between the imposing of the embargo and the successful engagement of the first two of the "Saar" class boats built in Israel during the October war allows the conclusion that they were built with the active assistance of the original producers. And now Durban too produces with designs by the West German Lürssen Werft yards!

### **Koor Enterprises**

A leading role in the economic cooperation with South Africa is played by the companies of the Histadruth Union and especially by the Koor Industries which have the largest number of joint ventures with South African firms (see table) true to the motto of its general manager: "What is good for Israel is important for Koor" (Israel Industry and Commerce and Trade News, June 1974). The Koor concern has about 20.000 employees in nearly all business lines. A quarter of its home sales are with the Israeli Ministry of Defence. The Koor President, Meir Amit, is the former chief of the Israeli Secret Services and as such was responsible for the abduction of the torpedo boats from Cherbourg harbour. The Koor-Inter-Trade with 1.3 bill. dollars (1974) is the biggest exporting house of Israel (Israel Industry and Commerce and Trade News, June 1974). Engaged in the armament production are mainly the electronics concern TADIRAN (with 35 % US-





*Patrolboat Reshef*

## Relations Israel — Federal Republik of Germany

Relations between Israel and the FRG were regarded as "special" right from the beginning because of the historic debt from the Nazi holocaust. It was claimed that Germans should make good for the crimes against Jews by supporting Zionism and Israel.

### Historical background

An information nearly completely unknown to the German and the world public is the cooperation between Hitler fascism and Zionism between 1933 and 1938. As soon as the Nazis came to power the Zionist Union of Germany offered them cooperation as proved by the following statement made in Berlin on the 21st of June, 1933: "For its practical goals Zionism also believes in gaining the support of basically anti-Jewish governments, because the handling of the Jewish question is not a matter of sentimentality but a realistic problem, in the solution of which all people and for the time being especially the German people are interested."

And indeed, the Nazi administration and the Zionists cooperated in organising the emigration of Jews, whom the Nazis wanted to get out of Germany and the Zionists wanted to get into Palestine. Special regulations allowed for the transfer of Jewish capital, until the 1938 Wannsee Conference decided on the physical liquidation of Jewish citizens, the beginning of a genocid, which all Germans are right to feel is a heavy historical burden. But Germans will not be freed from it by supporting Zionism, which is

committing a similar crime against the Palestinian people.

### Reparations

After the war Zionism and West German right wing politicians resumed cooperation very soon. Besides the payment of reparations to individuals collective reparation was paid to the state of Israel. Israel was thereby the first time officially recognised as the representative of all Jews. West-Germany at the same time took the whole financial burden and was thus recognised as the representative of the whole of Germany

Furthermore this "paying off the moral debt" was a necessary prerequisite for integrating West-Germany into the Western alliance and making it the anti-communist stronghold in the cold war.

The Luxemburg Treaty of 1952 which regulated the reparations provided for 3,45 Billion DM of collective reparations to the state of Israel. To avoid currency problems the values were transferred in the form of goods the Israeli government ordered in West-Germany. Israel ordered mainly equipment for heavy industry which constituted 70% of the reparations. As a result Israeli heavy industry which is engaged up to 50% in armaments production, was largely build up by West-German supplies. Orders resulting from the reparations agreement were a huge incentive to West-German economy in the fifties. In the parliamentary debate on the reparations agreement the post-war communist party of Germany (KPD) voted against it,

because it did not regulate reparations to all victims of the Nazi-regime (Gypsies or communists had for instance been subjected to the same persecution as Jews). The KPD criticised the emphasis on collective reparations and the paying off of material losses. In a bitter speech one of the communist members of parliament commented that those capitalists who once financed the Nazi party and its organizations were now making big profits from the reparations agreement.

Whereas progressive forces and Jewish organizations were very much aware and concerned about neo-Nazi activities in post-war West-Germany the Zionist Israeli government regarded the holding of important functions by Nazis in the West-German government and administration less a matter of protest than a chance to blackmail the West-German government.

### **Military aid**

The most striking example for this is West-Germany's military aid to Israel. The reparations agreement explicitly excluded the supply of military goods of any kind. This was vital for Germany because of its relations with the Arab states. West-Germany then began to fight at the diplomatic front against recognition of the German Democratic Republik (GDR); the so called Hallstein Doktrin claimed that the Federal Republic was the sole representative of Germany. Most of the Arab states had recognised West Germany diplomatically but not East Germany — and it was therefore a big risk for the Adenauer government to agree on a secret pact giving mili-

tary aid to Israel, which did not fit at all in the concept of West German realpolitik at the time. But things began moving at the trial of Adolf Eichmann, a figure responsible for the killing of Jews in Nazi-Germany. One of the "theorists" of Hitler's racial policy Dr. Globke, who published the legal comments to racial legislation in Germany (*Kommentare zur Deutschen Rassengesetzgebung*), was secretary of state in the Adenauer government and it would have been very embarrassing and damaging for West-Germany to have this government official mentioned at the trial or called as a witness. So obviously, Adenauer and David Ben Gurion came to a secret arrangement that the Israeli government in its Eichmann trial propaganda made a clear distinction between the "old" and the "new" Germany. In return West-Germany granted military aid to Israel amounting to 320 Million DM.

The supplies consisted of second hand weapons from the West-Germany armed forces, mostly of American origin. It should be noted here that contacts on the military level started as early as 1957 when defence ministers Simon Peres (Israel) and Franz-Josef Strauß (FRG) met secretly in Bavaria and arranged that West-Germany could obtain samples of the Soviet weapons captured by Israel during the Sinai campaign in 1956. In return, the West German Army was going to buy Israeli UZI machine guns.

The disastrous consequences the military aid affair had on the "traditionally good" Arab-West-German relations, account for the fact that after stopping of deli-

veries in 1964 (which did not prevent 13 Arab states to break diplomatic relations with Bonn) no military hardware was transferred to Israel from West-Germany.

### Scientific cooperation

In this context it is important to note that the long standing and good scientific relations between Israel and West-Germany do by no means serve peaceful purposes alone. This can be derived from the simple fact that according to the SIPRI Yearbook 1972, at least 50% of Israel's spending on Research and Development is on military R&D. It is very unlikely that the estimated 80 Million DM spent on scientific cooperation agreements up to now could exclude military R&D.

Scientific cooperation started in the late fifties, when West-German atomic scientists took up contact with scientists of the Weizmann-Institute in Israel. West-Germany sponsored research projects and financed installations like the 6-MV-Tandem-von-de-Graaf accelerator, worth 6 Million DM, which enabled Israel to set up a department of experimental nuclear physics in the Weizmann Institut in Rehovot. In 1963 the up to then informal scientific relations were regulated by a cooperation agreement and the MINERVA society, a subsidiary of the West-German Max Planck Gesellschaft was founded as a special institution to sponsor scientific cooperation with Israel.

Foundations like "Stiftung Volkswagenwerk" or "Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft" too have special programmes for sponsoring the exchange of scientists or joint West-German-Israeli research projects.

### Economic relations and economic aid

The FRG is after the USA the most important partner in foreign trade for Israel. Not only were West-German goods introduced to the Israeli market by the reparations transfers. In 1967 the West-German society for the promotion of German-Israeli trade (Deutsche Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wirtschaftsbeziehungen mit Israel e.V.) was founded, the president of the trade-union owned Bank für Gemeinwirtschaft being one of the initiators (See p.54).

At the end of the reparations transfers an agreement on capital aid was signed, under which from 1959 up to 1976 1.64 Billion DM have been paid. The yearly credit of now 140 Million DM is given at 3% interest for 20 years and no strings attached.

West-German private direct investments have increased from 20.9 Million DM in 1970 to 418 Million DM by the end of 1975. This increase is partly due to the promotion of capital export to Israel by the German DEG (Deutsche Entwicklungsgesellschaft) which is dealing in capital export to developing countries. Under West-German tax law Israel is treated as a developing country, which means low interest credits and special guarantees are given.

Finally the West-German government was using its influence in the European common market towards signing the preferential agreement with Israel in 1975, which opens the European market to Israeli goods.



### Political support

There are a lot of forms of political and ideological support for Zionism- as the most important repression of Palestinians in the FRG should be mentioned. Since 1968 and supported by the student revolt the General Union of Palestinian Workers (GUPW) and the General Union of Palestinian Students (GUPS) had started successful agitation for the Palestinian question. Especially in the younger generation the completely uncritical attitude towards Israel and Zionism diminished. The Black September Operation in Munich at the 1972 Olympic games supplied the excuse for the expulsion of

at least 400 Palestinian students and workers. Under the pretext that they were supporting terrorists the Palestinian mass organisations GUPS and GUPW were declared illegal in West-Germany. Protesting against anti-Arab propaganda and supporting the liberation movements in Palestine and Southern Africa the political predecessor of the German African Arab Bureau, the German Africa Society, was liquidated in 1975 by the Federal Government which withdrew regular funds.

*Facts and figures from: Abdel Hadi et al., BRD, Israel und die Palästinenser, Köln 1973*

*Foreign Minister Allon and Chancellor Schmidt*





participation) and the factories of Koor Metal which belong to the most export-intensive branches of the concern. In this way West German union companies which without exception have excellent business relations with the companies of the Histadruth participate in the South Africa trade. The Koor concern and the West German Bank für Gemeinwirtschaft, for example, have a joint subsidiary in Israel, the Industrial Services Corporation Ltd. which deals in export financing; the aim of this company is the promotion of Israel's exports. It is not known that exports to South Africa are excluded from this promotion (Israel's Außenhandel, Oct./Nov. 1968 and July 1973).

### **Internationalization of Production**

The present model of South African-Israeli economic relations — South African raw materials exchanged for Israeli know-how — according to ambassador Itzhak Unna is to be improved so that primary products are imported from South Africa which are to be processed in Israel and then reexported (Financial Mail, Johannesburg, June 7, 1974). In this way the South African raw materials and cheap labour can be "combined" profitably with relatively cheap and highly qualified Israeli labour. Israel thus finds its place in a vertical international division of labour which is not only typical for the armament industry. For example, Israel is only able to produce its highly developed armament supplies with the cooperation and supplies from the United States and probably also from France, the Federal Republic of

Germany and other industrial nations. One of these cases is the supply of the Kfir's jet engines by General Electric (USA); a much better example for the character and development of this division of labour is furnished by the Israeli electronics industry; 'Most of its (the Israeli electronics) major plants were founded as joint ventures with U. S. companies who own, invest, provide 'know-how', licensing and marketing or have undertaken other arrangements with Israel enterprises' (Israeli Industry and Commerce and Trade News, Sep. 1975). Meanwhile, Israel not only supplies components and spare parts for US weapon systems to the U. S. itself but — through TADIRAN, for example — provides licences and know-how to countries like South Africa.

### **Backdoor into Europe**

The advantage Israel gains from the cooperation with South Africa are obvious. Blick durch die Wirtschaft (April 22, 1976) reports that "South African diplomats are of the opinion that the future South African-Israeli joint venture opens South Africa a backdoor into the EEC and the United States. They remind of respective agreements between Israel and the EEC which are to be enacted in July 1977. Similar negotiations have taken place between the United States and Israel. South Africa wants to export primary products to Israel which after processing can then be reexported to the countries of the EEC and the United States." For South Africa a further advantage from its cooperation with Israel is the fact that Israel has long standing



*The Uzi submachine gun – „the finest ever provided to any army”*

partly institutionalised scientific contacts with Western Europe and the United States. The so-called MINERVA Gesellschaft, a subsidiary of the Max-Planck-Gesellschaft, serves the scientific cooperation with the FRG; through this society Israeli scientists have access to the results of scientific basic research in the Federal Republic. How close Israel's ties are with the West European scientific community, is illustrated by the following example: in January 1974 the "Seventh European Conference on Physics and Chemistry of Complex Nuclear Reactions" took place in the kibbutz Genossar in Israel. It was organised by the Israeli Weizmann Institute and the Atomic Energy Commission together with the European Physical Society. The West German delegate to this conference was Prof. Wolfgang Gentner, Max-Planck-Institute (Jerusalem Post, January 2, 1974).

"In view of a possible arms embargo against South Africa" the Johannesburg Financial Mail (June 7,

1974) is of the opinion that "at least our strategic needs might well have to be met, in part at any rate, by Israel." This role too, Israel can only play with the active help and cooperation of its imperialistic friends: Israel, a "Third Force", but with reversed premises.

#### Notes

- 1) Peter Hellyer, Israel and South Africa, Development of Relations 1967-1974, a paper submitted in October 1974 to the United Nations Special Committee on Apartheid and inscribed as an official document of the 1974 UN General Assembly, reprinted by Palestine Action, 103 Gower Str., London WC 1, December 1975.
- 2) See Israels Außenhandel, February 1971, and Financial Mail, Johannesburg, April 4, 1975.
- 3) Hellyer, op. cit., p. 8
- 4) Jean Labayle Couhat, Les Flottes de Combat, 1976, Paris

*Birgit Sommer is Middle-East-Editor of 3. Welt Magazin (Third World Magazine), Bonn.*

## Military Collaboration and Co

Date	Item
1962	<i>Israel supplies 32 Centurion tanks to the RSA.</i>
1963	<i>Israel "possibly" supplies spare parts to the RSA.</i>
End of May, 1967	<i>South African Jews go to Israel as volunteers, officially military employed.</i>
June 1967	<i>According to International Herald Tribune a South African mission flew to Israel during the June war to study tactics and use of weapons.</i>
October 1967	<i>General Mordechai Hod, chief of the Israeli Air Force reports "in detail" to the South African chief of staff about experience in the "Blitz".</i>
January 1970	<i>The Jewish Telegraph Agency reports that "the South African government is about to export tanks to Israel". This refers to a 65 t tank with a heavy gun built on the lines of the British "Chieftain".</i>
May 1971	<i>Israel offers to sell three aircraft to South Africa to replace three crashed aircraft of the South African Air Force.</i>
1971	<i>In a heavily disputed article in the International Herald Tribune, C. L. Sulzberger reports that South Africa is producing the Israeli submachine gun UZI under a licence granted through Belgium. Further he reports rumours that Israel has handed on the blueprints of the French Mirage obtained through espionage to South Africa.</i>
1971	<i>The Israeli firm TADIRAN offers South Africa electronic equipment for military purposes.</i>
1971	<i>A five man sales mission from the state-owned Israeli ELTA is sent to the Republic of South Africa to</i>

## peration in Defence Production

### Sources

*SIPRI, Arms Trade Register, Stockholm, 1975*  
*SIPRI, Arms Trade with the Third World, Stockholm 1971, p. 680*  
*Rand Daily Mail, May 31, 1967*

### Comments

*International Herald Tribune, April 30, 1971*

*Rand Daily Mail, Oct. 10, 1967*

*Jewish Telegraph Agency, Jan. 20, 1970; Hellyer, P., p. 15*

*This is denied by the Israeli ambassador to the U. N., Tekoa, in a letter to the Security Council.*

*Rand Daily Mail, Sept. 11, 1971; Hellyer, p. 20*

*International Herald Tribune, April 30, 1971*

*The South African aircraft industry, like the Israeli, is building a fighter plane along the lines of the Mirage.*

*Financial Mail Johannesburg, Sept. 24, 1971*

*TADIRAN is jointly owned by Koor (50 %), General Telephone and Electronics International (USA) (35 %), Israel's Ministry of Defence (15 %).*

*Financial Mail Johannesburg, Sept. 24, 1971*

*ELTA is a subsidiary of the state-owned Israeli Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI).*

- 1972 *sell ground-to-air communication equipment for the South African Ministry of Defence.*  
*Major supplies of Israeli spare parts for Mirage and other weapon systems to South Africa. Israel is presumably charged with the servicing of the Mirage.*
- May 1973 *During the Paris Air Show an Israeli "official" points out the usefulness for South Africa of the Arava. The Arava had already been taken for trials to South Africa and there are rumours that South Africa has ordered a certain number of the aircraft.*
- October 1973 *The Egyptian government discloses that a Mirage of unknown nationality had been shot down on the Suez front. According to the London Daily Telegraph South Africa had during the October war sent Mirage fighters in support of Israel via the Portuguese Atlantic islands.*
- October 1973 *According to the Rand Daily Mail 1,500 Jews with South African connections served in the Israeli Armed Forces during the war, 800 of whom took part in the Suez crossing. Dr. C. L. Kowalsky was captured by the Syrians at Mount Hermon. After his release he visited his relatives in South Africa.*
- 1974 *SIPRI confirms the assumed delivery of sea-to-sea missiles of the type Gabriel to South Africa. Date of delivery: December 1974, for the equipment of seven new South African ships.*
- 1974 *According to Monitor, Israel supplies South Africa with the following: light guns, heavy mortars, hand guns electronic and mechanic warning systems for border security.*
- 1975 *The former chief of the Israeli secret services and present President of Koor Industries, General Meir Amit, during a visit to South Africa discloses that Israeli officers regularly lecture before an audience of South African officers*

*afrika heute, June/July 1973*

*See p. 52*

*Hellyer, p. 24*

*Daily Telegraph, October 31, 1973,  
Hellyer, P., p. 25*

*Rand Daily Mail, Oct. 22, 1973,  
Rand Daily Mail, July 12, 1974  
Hellyer, p. 25*

*SIPRI, Yearbook 1975, Stockholm  
1975, p. 239*

*Monitor, Sept. 10, 1974*

*Rand Daily Mail, July 7, 1975  
Guardian, July 9, 1975  
UN, Unit on Apartheid, Notes  
and Documents, No. 31/75,  
September 1975.*

*Koor industries are owned by  
Israeli trade-union Histadruth and  
one of the most important arma-  
ment producers of Israel,*

	<i>about modern warfare and anti-guerilla tactics. Asked whether Israel and South Africa have good military relations he answers: "That is an understatement".</i>
<i>1976</i>	<i>Financial Times London reports that Israel is offering its tactical aircraft Kfir to South Africa.</i>
<i>1976</i>	<i>South Africa is going to build six patrolboats of the Reshef class in a licence of the Israeli firm Ramta. They will be equipped with "Gabriel" missiles.</i>
<i>April 1976</i>	<i>South Africa's Premier Vorster visits IAI as well as Reshef patrolboats in Sharm-el-Sheikh; the supply of Kfir is denied.</i>

## Economic C

<b>Date</b>	<b>Item</b>
<i>1969</i>	<i>Through its subsidiary, Gold Star Line, the Israeli line Zim puts into service four new ships for the South Africa-Japan route.</i>
<i>November 1969</i>	<i>The South African corporation Placo takes up the marketing for South Africa of the Commodore Executive Jets (10 seats) of the Israel Aircraft Industries.</i>
<i>October</i>	<i>The Director-General in the Israeli Ministry for Tourism, Meir de Shalit, opens the first Israeli government tourist bureau on African continent in South Africa.</i>
<i>July 1970</i>	<i>Agreement about a credit line of 10,7 Mio. Rand for the financing of investment goods imports from South Africa between the quasi-governmental South African Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) and the Foreign Trade Bank Ltd., Tel Aviv.</i>
<i>October 1970</i>	<i>Steel Pipe Industry (Pty) (South Africa) sells a steel pipe factory for 250.000 Rand to the Middle East Tube Co., Haifa, and takes up a share in the company.</i>
<i>December 1970</i>	<i>Tadiran (Israel) negotiates with C. F. Fuchs (RSA), the licenced production of sophisticated electronic equipment in South Africa.</i>
<i>February 1971</i>	<i>African-Israel Investments (Israel-owned, with 25 % South African interest) together</i>



*Financial Times, Febr. 20, 1976*

*Les Flottes de Combat 1976,  
Paris, p. 56*

*Jerusalem Post, March 9, 1976  
Financial Times, Feb. 12, 1975*

*Jerusalem Post, April 13, 1976  
Guardian, April 10, 1976*

*Ramta is a subsidiary of the  
state-owned IAI. The shipyards  
in Durban, South Africa, and  
Haifa are being extended.*

## operation

### Sources

*Rand Daily Mail, Oct. 12, 1969  
Hellyer, p. 14*

*Rand Daily Mail, November 27,  
1969  
Hellyer, p. 15, 1)*

*Rand Daily Mail, October 28,  
1969*

*Nachrichten für den Außen-  
handel, October 25, 1970,  
and South African Financial  
Gazette, July 17, 1970*

*The Star, Oct. 3, 1970*

*Rand Daily Mail, Febr. 25,  
1971,  
Hellyer, p. 17*

*Rand Daily Mail, Febr. 25,  
1971*

### Comments

*Since 1971 monthly sailings*

*The credits have a run of up to 10  
years with an interest of 6 %.*

*Steel Pipe is a subsidiary of the  
African Gate Holding.*

*Tadiran is owned to 35 % by  
US interests and produces mainly  
for the armament industry.*

	<i>with IDC (RSA) finance a building project in Venezuela.</i>
1971	<i>Japhet Bank (Israel) opens the first permanent agency of any Israeli bank in South Africa.</i>
1971	<i>Desiree Clothing Group (RSA) runs the Cecil Knits textile factory in Israel.</i>
1972	<i>Bank Leumi, New York, a subsidiary of Bank Leumi, Tel Aviv, has a 2 Mio. Dollar interest in a banking syndicate led by the European-American Banking Corporation set up to raise a secret 50 Mio. loan for the South African Ministry of Finances.</i>
January 1973	<i>Bank Leumi (Israel) opens a branch in Johannesburg.</i>
1973	<i>A group of South African and European investors led by the German-Jewish business man Arthur Brauner invests about 1 Billion IL in the biggest building projects of Israel, the "Mercaz Yisrael" in Ramat Gan. Building begins in 1974 and is expected to last 5 to 8 years.</i>
May 1973	<i>On the millionaires' conference in Jerusalem 1973, a South African firm announces the investment of 1 Mio. Dollars in a cotton factory which produces for the export to Africa. The raw materials are imported from South Africa.</i>
June 1973	<i>The state-owned South African Iscor and the Israeli trade union-owned Koor concern jointly found the Iskoor Ltd. in Israel. In 1973, Iskoor imports 30.000 t of steel from South Africa., 100.000 t in 1974. Half of Iskoor's buyers are firms of the Koor concern, the rest is sold to kibbutz and private industry.</i>
1973	<i>Shabal Engineering Works, Israel, and South African Power Tool and Equipment Company (Pty) (SAPCO) agree to exchange production techniques; SAPCO produces a range of Shabal products in licence.</i>
1974	<i>South African investors build the so-called South Africa House in Tel Aviv, a 26 floor building which houses the South African embassy, South African Airways and El Al. Other known South</i>

*Hellyer, p. 18*

*South African Digest, publ. by  
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,  
May 1971; Hellyer p. 18*

*South African Financial Ga-  
zette, May 28, 1971*

*Frankfurt Documents publ. by  
Corporate Information Center  
of the National Council of  
Churches, N. Y., July 1973*  
*Hellyer, p. 18*

*Japhet Bank is owned by the Ha-  
poalim Bank of the Israeli Hista-  
druth trade union.*

*South African Financial Gazette,  
January 5, 1973*  
*Israel Economist, April/May  
1973*

*Israel Economist, July 1973*

*Israel Economist, April 1974*  
*Israel Industry and Commerce,  
March 1975*

*Koor holds 51 % of the shares.  
At least 25 % of the production  
of Koor firms is military.*

*Rand Daily Mail, Oct. 16, 1973*  
*Hellyer, p. 24*

*Sunday Times, Johannesburg  
March 24, 1974*

- African investments in Israel: a factory complex in Holon near Tel Aviv, production of agricultural machines in a new free-trade area near Eilat, wire-netting factory near Ashdod.*
- 1974 *Koor and the South African Lembro Holdings(Pty) found the Agbro Ltd. which will produce herbicides and insecticides in South Africa. Koor covers 25 % of the costs, Lembro 75 %. The factory is built in a "border area" near East London, next to a bantustan. The Israeli Desalination Engineering Company builds a desalination plant in South Africa.*
- 1975 *Elbit Computers (Ltd.) sells computers to South Africa.*
- 1975 *450 Mio. Dollars are to be invested in the extension of the Haifa refinery complex half of which belongs to the Israel Corporation, the other half to a group of South African investors.*
- 1975 *The state-owned South African Railways has interests in an Israeli railroad project. The South African government facilitates joint ventures of South African and Israeli firms by a decision to permit financial participation in projects in Israel which have been approved by the Israeli Investment Authority.*
- 1976 *The Israeli company Tadiran is going to build a factory for the production of dry cell batteries in South Africa. To the factory is affiliated a newly-founded joint venture between Tadiran and the South African Conlite company.*
- April 1976 *In spite of restrictions on coal exports Premier Vorster sees "no objections" against the yearly export of one Mio. tons of coal from South Africa to Israel; an agreement has not yet been confirmed.*

*Israel Yearbook 1976, p. 243*  
*Jewish Chronicle, London,*  
*June 21, 1974*

*Lembro is a subsidiary of Adcock-Ingram in South Africa. The South African IDC offers an interest reduced loan of Rand 700.000*

*Israel Economist, January/February 1974*  
*Guardian, July 9, 1975*  
*Israel Economist, January/February 1975*

*Subsidiary of the multi-national Control Data Corporation, USA; minority interest held by Elron Electronics of Israel.*

*Israel Economist, May/June 1975 and July 1973*

*Guardian, July 9, 1975*

*Journal of Commerce (N. Y.), August 12, 1975*

*Capital-export is submitted to restrictions in South Africa.*

*Financial Times, April 14, 1976, see p. 60 and 62*

*Süddeutsche Zeitung, April 14, 1976*  
*Israel Economist, May/June 1975*  
*Middle East and African Economist, October 1975*

*Israel needs these imports for the Hadera power plant which runs on coal and which is due to go into operation by 1979. For the financing of equipment bought in the USA the American Ex-Im Bank provided a credit of 59 Mio. Dollars.*

# Nuclear C

## STEAG Kept the Ball

Survey of the present state of nuclear cooperation  
between the Republic of South Africa and the Federal Republic

Peter J. Friedmann

### Accusation against the FRG by the ANC

In the ANC's documentation 1) the Federal Republic is accused of providing South Africa with the means to produce nuclear weapons. The state-controlled company Steag in collaboration with the state-owned Gesellschaft für Kernforschung, GfK (Nuclear Research Corporation), is preparing the erection of a uranium enrichment plant using the German jet nozzle method in South Africa with the full knowledge of the Federal Government. According to this source, the first orders in connection with this project were placed with the MAN company, Nürnberg, in September 1974.

Further, the ANC reports factual findings which might have penal consequences:

- Secretary of state Haunschild acted as accessory in a subsidy fraud of the firm Urangesellschaft which used public subsidies for illegal uranium exploration in Rössing (Namibia) stating they were intended for other purposes. 2)

- The firm Urangesellschaft also holds a share of the Rössing Uranium Ltd. and has an option for the purchase of 40 % of its

uranium production. Since for example the export of all minerals from Namibia is against international law and since the government of the Federal Republic officially stopped German participation, the factual state of theft and being in possession of stolen goods is given.

- Illegal export of production of the jet nozzle method for uranium enrichment plants to South Africa by the GfK/Steag after the development of this method had been financed by the BMFT, though in the Federal Republic this method will never be used because of its high power consumption.

- Breach of the Non-Proliferation Treaty by the planned supplies of the MAN concern for the enrichment plant in South Africa which has not subscribed to it.

- Participation of the Federal Army in the erection of the uranium enrichment plant in South Africa by coding the MAN supplies using the unified NATO coding system.

- General Rall's journey to Pelindaba/South Africa meets with the approval of Minister of Defence Leber.

# ooperation

## A. Series of Contradictory Denials

According to the speaker for the government Bölling, the Federal Government is of the opinion that the statements and accusations of the ANC are "a mixture of truths, half-truths, and speculations". 3) In great haste the FAZ also reported that "according to official opinion (of Pretoria, the editor) the pamphlets presented by the African National Congress consist of a mixture of misunderstandings, speculative statements and misinterpretations which are based on a lack of expert knowledge". 4) Federal Minister Matthöfer sees in all this "a slanderous Communist campaign". 5) The Foreign Ministry tried to defame the ANC itself as the author of the accusations in order to make its statements look unconvincing and it defamed it as "saturated with Communists, pro-Russian" and as a "somewhat dim source." 6)

After the brochure of the ANC had been making headlines all over the world for more than a month already, and after General Rall had had to be fired accompanied by a lot of uproar, by mid of October the several ministerial bureaucrats at last were able to agree on a common "wording". 7) There they say that "the information contained in the brochure published by the African National Congress is incorrect. Likewise the statement that the Federal Government and the Government of South Africa are collaborating in uranium enrichment. The brochure also contains the statement

that the German Steag AG together with the South African company UCOR is heading a joint uranium enrichment project. The facts are that these two firms in 1973 agreed to compare the technical feasibility and the profitability of the South African enrichment method and the German jet nozzle method. South Africa concluded that its own method was more advantageous and for this reason no cooperation was agreed upon". It was mentioned, furthermore, that "an agreement between the Federal Government and the government of South Africa about secrecy is not intended."

This sentence just quoted was intended to do justice to the fact that the "enrichment method" is a "German state secret" as BMFT Secretary of state Haunschild in 1972 wrote to the President of the Atomic Energy Board (AEB), Roux. In direct contradiction to the "wording" now found, Haunschild had written: "We agreed in our talks that an agreement or an understanding between our countries about the secrecy of the method would at the time be inopportune." 8)

In this, as in the following case, the cover of the wording is a bit thin and fading: "The brochure further states that German scientists helped with the development of the South African enrichment method. In connection with this it must be stated that an exchange of personnel with the aim of a collaboration in the development of the South African method does not exist and never has." This does not in the least shake or refute the statement contained in the ANC's document that there is no South African method



Bundesministerium  
für Bildung und Wissenschaft  
Der Staatssekretär

SI BONN 9, den 12. Juli 1972  
Heussallee 2-10 (Hochhaus)  
Fernruf. 1081

Herrn

Dr. A. J. A. Roux  
Präsident des  
Atomic Energy Board  
Private Bag 256

Vertraulich

P r e t o r i a  
Südafrika

Sehr geehrter Herr Roux!

In unserem Gespräch in Ukukuza hatte ich Ihnen zugesagt, nach meiner Rückkehr in die Bundesrepublik Deutschland prüfen zu lassen, wie sichergestellt werden kann, daß Mitarbeiter einer Industriefirma, die in der Explorationsphase - also vor dem Beschluß über eine Zusammenarbeit - Kenntnis von Einzelheiten des Anreicherungsverfahrens erhalten, diese Informationen geheim halten.

Das Ergebnis der Prüfung liegt mir jetzt vor. Danach ist die Rechtslage wie folgt, soweit es den strafrechtlichen Geheimschutz betrifft:

1. Materieller Geheimschutz

- Der Schutz der fraglichen Kenntnisse als deutsches Staatsgeheimnis im Sinne der §§ 94, 95, 97 StGB setzt voraus (kumulativ),
  - Die Kenntnisse sind deutschen Regierungsstellen anvertraut.
  - Es besteht eine irgendwie geartete Vereinbarung über Geheimbehandlung zwischen der Bundesregierung und der Regierung Südafrikas.
  - Die Kenntnisse sind materiell geheimhaltungsbedürftig, d. n., daß ihre Preisgabe einen schweren Nachteil für die äußere Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland mit sich bringen könnte.
  - Die Kenntnisse werden von einer deutschen amtlichen Stelle oder auf deren Veranlassung geheimgehalten (faktische Geheimhaltung).

2. Vorbeugende technische Geheimhaltung

Hier handelt es sich um die formelle Behandlung als geheime Kenntnisse ohne Beurteilung des Geheimniswertes. Insoweit müßte zunächst von Regierungsseite die bindende Zusage gegeben werden, die geltenden Verfahren der Geheimhaltung anzuwenden oder den Experten, der die Kenntnisse zur Prüfung erhält, zu verpflichten, diese nach den vorgesehenen Verfahren zu behandeln (was voraussetzt, daß der Empfänger eine solche Verpflichtung eingeht).

Wer unbefugt so sekretierte Unterlagen ganz oder zum Teil einem anderen mitteilt oder öffentlich bekannt macht und dadurch wichtige öffentliche Interessen gefährdet, macht sich ohne Rücksicht auf die materielle Qualität der

Kenntnisse als deutsches Staatsgeheimnis nach Maßgabe des § 353 c) Strafgesetzbuch strafbar. Die Strafverfolgung setzt eine Ermächtigung der Bundesregierung voraus.

Ich hoffe, daß diese kurze Darstellung der Sach- und Rechtslage Ihre Fragen in ausreichender Weise beantwortet.

Bei unserem Gespräch waren wir uns einig, daß eine Vereinbarung oder Absprache zwischen unseren Ländern über die Geheimhaltung des Verfahrens zur Zeit nicht opportun wäre. Ich möchte aber noch einmal betonen, daß private deutsche Industriegruppen rechtlich völlig frei sind bei der Entscheidung über Beteiligungen an ausländischen Verfahren einschließlich von Absprachen über die vertrauliche Behandlung dabei erlangter Informationen, wie sie auch im umgekehrten Fall über nichtgeheime Kenntnisse frei verfügen können.

Die Firma STEAG habe ich von dieser Stellungnahme unterrichtet.

Mit freundlichen Grüßen

*Haunschild*  
(Haunschild)

## Translation

Ministry of Education and Science  
The Secretary of State

2-10 Heussallee  
53 Bonn  
Tel.: 1081  
12th July, 1972

Dr. A. J. A. Roux  
President of the  
Atomic Energy Board  
Private Bag 256

Pretoria  
South Africa

Confidential

Dear Dr. Roux,

In our discussion in Skukuza I had promised upon returning to the Federal Republic to initiate investigations in order to ensure that colleagues of an industrial company, who obtain detailed knowledge of the enrichment method in the exploratory phase (prior to any cooperation agreement) keep this information strictly secret.

The results of the investigation are now available, according to which the legal implications are the following, as far as they pertain to penal security:

## 1. Material Security

The protection of the details under consideration as a national State Secret according to paragraphs 94, 95, of the penal code presupposes (cumulative),

- The information is entrusted to German governmental offices.
- There exists some constituted agreement about the confidential nature between the Federal Republic and the Government of South Africa.
- The details fall materially under the category of necessary secret treatment, this means that the exposition of the material could lead to severe disadvantages for the external security of the Federal Republic.
- The details will be kept under strict security by an official German department or upon instructions of the latter (effective observance of security).

## 2. Preventive Technical Secrecy

This refers to the formal treatment as secret documents without valuation of the grade of secrecy. To that extent there would have to be above all a compulsory agreement made by the government to adopt prevailing security methods or to oblige the expert in charge of investigating the details to use the prescribed measures (this presupposes that the recipient submits himself to this obligation).

Any unauthorized person who partly or wholly discloses the contents of the secret documents or causes them to be made known publicly, and through these means endangers important public interests, is liable to penalty under paragraph 353c of the penal code, irrespective of the material quality of the information. The prerequisite for the prosecution is an authorization of the Federal Government.

I do hope that this brief description of the state of affairs and the legal implications has sufficed to answer your questions satisfactorily.

In our discussion we both shared the opinion that an agreement or arrangement between our countries relating to the secrecy of this process would not be opportune at this present moment. I would like, however, to emphasize once more that private German industrial companies enjoy complete legal freedom of decision concerning participation in foreign ventures including arrangements relating to the confidential treatment of attained information; reversely they may also possess freely knowledge of non-secret information.

I have also informed the STEAG Company of this position.

Yours sincerely  
Haunschild

but that the patented German jet nozzle method is to be applied in South Africa with the consent of the Federal Government. Lastly, the Federal Government also could not overlook the unanimous opinion of the entire press that the documents proving the handing on of the method, some of which originate from the South African embassy, are authentic. But there is still more to this.

### **Chasing the Perpetrator**

Minister Matthöfer believed in, as we have already mentioned, a "Communist slander campaign" while the BMWi because of the competition with the German firms taking part in the project was rather thinking along the lines of Western secret service activity. As a matter of fact, the South African embassy attributed the theft to an undercover GDR agent. Thanks to most painstaking researches the embassy thought it had uncovered the agent, or, rather, a whole spade of agents: first of all a cleaner got the sack who was caught rattling at a door. Then it was the turn of the driver of the military attache against whom the Federal Attorney is now investigating because of "suspected secret service activity".

For weeks the in the case of suspected agents otherwise rather watchful Bonn security services watched "tall Hendrik" van den Bergh, chief of the infamous South African terror police-force BOSS turning everything upside down in the embassy in Bad Godesberg. Did he provide Senior Prosecutor Schwellnus in Bonn with the new hint?

Schwellnus reported to the press

that there were "pending" investigations under foot against the AAB board member Geisler because of a carpet that was said to have vanished in May 1975 "to the disadvantage of the South African embassy". While no prosecutor was bothering about Rall, the AAB asked whether the doings reported in the documentation of the ANC of members of the government, the armed forces, German firms and diplomats were to be swept under the said carpet. According to unconfirmed reports Schwellnus answered the demand for the prosecution of these charges by saying "We do not want to carry things too far!" 9) — In any case, the business partners of South Africa can again have confidence: the probable perpetrators are being prosecuted, the embassy's "safe" is safe again.

### **How to Build your Own Atom Bomb**

Today, there are two ways to produce atom bombs: 1. the enrichment of uranium isotope U 235 up to ca. 90 % which is contained in natural uranium at the rate of 0,7 %. Most existing nuclear weapons have been produced this way. Three physical methods can be applied: gaseous diffusion, gas centrifuging and the German jet nozzle method. The jet nozzle system is patented world-wide by the GfK/Steag. Like the other two methods it is equally suitable for the production of nuclear explosive material as well as for the production of reactor fuel in which case the enrichment process is stopped at ca. 3 % U 235 contents.

2. Plutonium which like 90 %

rich U 235, can also be used as a nuclear explosive, results as waste from the burning of uranium in nuclear reactors. By chemical methods it can be produced from this residue. India, for example, obtained its nuclear weapons this way.

In an expert opinion Professor Jörn Bleck of the University of Bremen attests the possibility that any kind of enrichment plant can be used for military purposes. "Civil and military utilization of nuclear energy are not two mutually exclusive aims; on the contrary, civil and military goals to a considerable extent demand the same technology. Furthermore, even after the development of a purely civil utilization of nuclear energy (that is, nuclear power-plants) it is possible to use it anytime and at once for military purposes (that is, the production of plutonium bombs). A decisive stage in nuclear technology is the isotope enrichment. Isotope enrichment is of the same importance for civil as for military purposes. Disposal over one's own plant is a most important facilitation for the uncontrolled production of material for nuclear weapons. There is no technical reason for which the enriched uranium from a plant built for civil purposes after some processing could not be used for nuclear weapons. One only has to — feed it into the plant again and again until the high percentage of U 235 needed is reached, or — and this is the easier way — one keeps it at the 3 % ("peaceful") enrichment level, uses this weakly enriched uranium as nuclear fuel in reactors (nuclear power plants,


for example) and afterwards separates the fissionable plutonium originating from the uranium by a chemical process. (This operation, the so-called reprocessing of the fuel material, necessarily also belongs to civil utilization of nuclear energy.)

To the best of my knowledge there exist no technical guarantees that even one of these processes could be excluded. (There is only the hope for effective control, contractual guarantees or political confidence. I abstain from judging what to think of these guarantees.)"

#### **South Africa has the know-how for uranium enrichment**

August 15th, 1973 AEB/UCOR and the firm Steag contractually agreed to award a sublicense through Steag. 10) An interministerial conference of secretaries of state (AA, BMFT, BMWi, Chancellery) on September 27th, 1973 advocated the treaty. The cabinet meeting following on October 17th, 1973 postponed for a week the decision about the granting of a licence as well as about the export crediting and conditional guarantees for the plant jointly planned by Steag and UCOR; apart from ministers Eppler and Maihofer all other members of the Cabinet, among them the present members of government Schmidt, Genscher, Focke, Franke, Bahr, Leber, as well as ex-chancellor Brandt voted in favour. 11)

In December 1973, the South African Minister of Finance Diedrichs had talks with German banks about possible private financing of the project; Prof. Becker of the GfK Karlsruhe, for example, spent



*H.H. Haunschild, Secretary of State of the Federal Ministry of Research and Technology*

a week in the South African nuclear research centre Pelindaba. — Only a few days after his return Steag and UCOR concluded an agreement for the drafting of a technologically large-scale enrichment plant using the jet-nozzle system. In September 1974 an order was placed by the South African firm Escom with MAN, Nürnberg, for the delivery of the planned plant.

These are the most prominent out of a whole lot of data and proofs of the collaboration between Bonn and Pretoria, documented for the first time by the ANC and then corroborated by journalists of several press organs .

**...they have it,  
they have it not, they have it ...**

Then followed another long series of contradictory denials. Prof. Becker, inventor of the jet nozzle system, who in the meantime had left GfK to dedicate more time to his own researches, denied a specific collaboration with the South Africans. On the other hand, he especially acknowledged that the flow of information during the development period of the system "made it possible for all specialists, South Africa included, to obtain the necessary information". 12) The speaker for the government, Bölling, however, regards it as impossible that South African scientists on the occasion

GÜNTHER RAILL  
Generalkonsulent

Bonn, den 5. Juni 1973

*Exzellenz*

Als Anlage darf ich Ihnen den Durchdruck eines Briefes übersenden, den ich heute an Herrn Kurt Dahlmann gesandt habe und aus dem Sie ersehen, daß ich leider aus dienstlichen Gründen meine für dieses Jahr geplante Reise nach Südafrika nicht durchführen kann, obwohl ich auch bereits das Einverständnis meines Ministers dafür vorliegen habe. Die Gründe sind in den im Laufe dieses Jahres zu erwartenden Aktivitäten bezüglich Rüstungsplanung, Entscheidungstermine für unsere Hauptwaffensysteme und Wehrstrukturvorbereitungen für den parlamentarischen Geschäftsgang begründet, die ich zum Zeitpunkt des Festlegens der Reise noch nicht absehen konnte. Ich bitte daher sehr um Entschuldigung und Verständnis, wenn ich aus den im Brief angegebenen Gründen nunmehr eine feste Zusage für Herbst 1974 mache, einen Zeitpunkt, den ich sicher nicht mehr zu ändern brauche. Für Ihre inzwischen bereits getroffenen Maßnahmen möchte ich Ihnen, Exzellenz, meinen herzlichen Dank sagen und hoffe, Ihnen gelegentlich mündlich noch einige Erläuterungen geben zu können.

*Mit besten Grüßen  
Hr. Exzellenz,  
sehr geehrter Herr,*

Seiner Exzellenz  
dem Botschafter der Republik Südafrika  
Herrn Donald B. Sole

5 Köln / Rhein  
Heumarkt 1

*Günter J.*



## Translation

GÜNTHER RALL  
Lieutenant General

Bonn, June 5, 1973

Excellency,

Enclosed please find a copy of a letter which I sent to Mr. Kurt Dahlmann today telling him that I cannot make my journey to South Africa as originally planned this year, although my Minister has already agreed to the trip. The cancellation is due to activities to be expected this year in the field of armament planning, upcoming decisions in our main weapon systems and preparations for parliamentary procedures in the field of defence structure — events which I could not foresee at the time of fixing my journey. I therefore ask you to accept my apologies and to understand that for the reasons named, I now give you a binding promise for my visit in autumn 1974, a date which certainly will not have to be changed. I would like to thank you, Your Excellency, for the measures you have already taken in connection with my planned visit and I hope to be able to explain further details to you in a verbal exchange.

With best regards  
Yours, Excellency, truly  
Günther Rall

His Excellency  
the Ambassador of the Republic of South Africa  
Mr. Donald B. Sole  
5 Cologne/Rhine  
Heumarkt 1

of "working visits" to GfK Karlsruhe were able to obtain informations about the construction of uranium enrichment plants. 13) The monthly of the German-South African Society, "Afrika-Post", financed by Pretoria, impertinently writes thus: "The fact that scientific collaboration, for example in the development of enrichment systems, is taking place between German and South African agencies has been known for years from publications of both sides and is nothing new." 14) The clearest denial that uranium is

enriched in Pelindaba using a German invention, came from Pretoria and Steag. Foreign Minister Muller repeated the claim asserted in 1970 that South Africa had developed a new system for uranium enrichment. 15) Steag said the same. 16) Incompatible with their denial, however, remains the fact that in 1973 the granting of a licence was contractually agreed between Steag and UCOR and that still in the same year, after the agreement had allegedly become void, a "comparative study of the profitability of both systems" was

agreed upon on October 18th, 1973. 17) It is also unconvincing that already on April 12th, 1975 the director of UCOR characterizes the result of the comparison as positive 18), and that Steag on April 9th, 1971 in spite of the withdrawal on October 10th, 1973 of the grant of the licence for the jet nozzle system, writes: " ... for plants of this kind all energy-intensive methods as the jet nozzle system can be considered in countries with a favourable price-level of electrical energy (for example, Australia, Canada, South Africa)." 19) Rather peculiar in all this, furthermore, is the fact that the development of the jet nozzle system which because of its high power consumption will never be applied in the FRG, was still financed by the BMFT with 50 million DM. 20) In 1975, after the South African experimental plant had been successfully put into operation, the financing of the development of the system was assessed by Bonn. 21)


Do they have it now or don't they ? The ideologically unsuspecting expert correspondent of the Vereinigte Wirtschaftsdienste, Lehmann, writes: "Pelindaba is particularly reserved about its own methods of enrichment. It is not denied that it is the jet nozzle system developed by the Karlsruhe Professor Becker as yet on laboratory scale. But, says Pelindaba, ' from a certain point onwards these systems part way '. " 22)

Provided the case that transfer of technology from the FRG to South Africa actually took place, does the FRG at least gain something from it ? Some facts which among other things show

that this is not a hypothetical question at all point out that the answer must be yes. Both the Hamburg and the Rheinisch-Westfälische Elektrizitätswerke buy their natural uranium from South Africa. 23) The Federal Government, before the publication of the ANC documentation, tried to deny this state of affairs: " The Federal Government at the present time is not thinking of obtaining uranium from South Africa." 24) And Secretary of state Hauff told the Lower House on October 1st, 1975 "that the Federal Government accepts that the uranium supply of the Federal Republic of Germany can be secured from other sources." 25) But only one week later the speaker for the government, Bölling, corrected the statements of the government up to that point: he said that the Federal Republic bought 40 % of its uranium imports from South Africa. 26) According to Steag, Steag and UCOR have agreed to deliver 20 % of the uranium enriched in South Africa to Steag. Foreign Minister Muller pretends to know nothing about this agreement 27) but Steag-chief Schulte says of a possible participation of Steag in the South African plant: " We have a moral claim to this." 28)

### **Then one also Needs a Nuclear Power Plant**

Though the Kraftwerk Union (KWU) had applied to the Federal Government for a permit to export two nuclear power plants to South Africa 29), and though already in spring 1975 an application for the Hermes Export Credit Guarantee had been filed with the Federal Government 30),



*Lieutenant General G. Rall*

Bonn denied this initially. In connection with corresponding accusations by Nigeria, the AA said that speculations about a nuclear cooperation with South Africa were misleading. 31) They said in particular that no application for Hermes Export Credit Guarantees for nuclear reactors for South Africa had been received. 32)

On the very day of publication of the ANC documentation a speaker for the AA at the Federal

Press Conference again said: "The Federal Government has no information about a collaboration in the nuclear sector for which an export licence would be necessary. The Federal Government upholds the principle of the free enterprise system, we do not control our economy and we do not have the intention of taking it up. The Federal Government can only intervene — and it will only intervene — if according to the respective law it has to grant

DETLEV ROHWEDDER  
Staatssekretär  
Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft

53 Bonn-Dulsdorf, den 5. Mai 1975  
Fernruf 76-3950

An den  
Vizepräsidenten des Atomic  
Energy Board  
Herrn Dr. J.W.L. de Villiers

und den

Stellv. Generalmanager der Uranium  
Corporation  
Herrn Dr. R.S. Loubser

P r e t o r i a

Sehr geehrter Herr de Villiers!  
Sehr geehrter Herr Loubser!

Nach meiner Rückkehr nach Deutschland möchte ich Ihnen noch einmal auf das herzlichste für die großartige Gastfreundschaft danken, mit der Sie meine Kollegen und mich in Ihrem Land aufgenommen haben. Sie haben uns ein wundervolles Wochenende im Park bereitet und Sie haben erlebt, wie groß unser Entzücken über das, was wir gesehen haben, war. Ich weiß die Tatsache sehr zu schätzen, daß Sie sich über ein langes und schönes Wochenende von Ihren Familien getrennt haben, um den fremden Deutschen die Schönheiten

Ihres Landes zu zeigen. Ich hoffe, daß ich einmal die Möglichkeit habe, Sie ähnlich gastfreundlich hier bei uns zu empfangen.

Mein Dank erstreckt sich auch auf den für uns hoch interessanten Nachmittag in Pelindaba. Ich wünsche Ihnen weitere große Erfolge in Ihrer Arbeit, die in aller Welt mit so großer Aufmerksamkeit verfolgt wird. Es wäre schön, wenn es zu einer langfristigen und für beide Seiten fruchtbaren Zusammenarbeit auf ihrem Gebiet oder überhaupt in der friedlichen Nutzung der Kernenergie zwischen uns kommen könnte. Ich habe inzwischen damit begonnen, die Anregungen und Gespräche zu sammeln und denjenigen mitzuteilen, die an einem engeren Austausch interessiert sind und dafür auch in Frage kommen.

Ich hoffe, daß ich Sie in nicht allzu ferner Zeit hier in Deutschland wieder sehe. Bis dahin verbleibe ich mit einer großen Dankesschuld und herzlichsten Grüßen auch im Namen meiner Kollegen als

Ihr



P.S.: Darf ich Sie bitten, mich auch Herrn Dr. Hugo zu empfehlen? Wir sind ihm für seine Darlegungen ebenfalls außerordentlich dankbar.

### Translation

DETLEV ROHWEDDER  
Staatssekretär  
Federal Ministry of Economics

53 Bonn-Duisdorf, May 5, 1975  
Telephone 76-3850

To the Vice President of the Atomic Energy Board  
Dr. J.W.L. de Villiers and the  
Deputy General Manager of the Uranium Corporation  
Dr. R.S. Loubser

Dear Mr. de Villiers, dear Mr. Loubser!

After my return to Germany I would like to thank you again for the great hospitality extended to myself and my colleagues during our

stay in your country. We had a wonderful weekend in the Park and you have witnessed how enchanted we were with the things we saw. I appreciate very much the fact that you separated from your families for a long and beautiful weekend in order to show us strange Germans the beauty of your country. I hope, that I shall have the opportunity to receive you here one day and to extend the same hospitality to you.

My gratitude includes the afternoon in Pelindaba, which was highly interesting for us. I wish you continued great success in your work, which is followed with great interest all around the world. It would be nice if we could come to a long-term and mutually fruitful co-operation in your field or in the general field of peaceful use of nuclear energy. I have already started to put together suggestions and the contents of our talks and brought them to the attention of those who are interested in a closer exchange and who would be the right type of partners.

I hope to meet you here in Germany in the not too distant future. Until then I remain with the deepest gratitude and cordial greetings also in the name of my colleagues,

Yours D. Rohwedder

P.S. May I ask you to give my regards also to Dr. Hugo? We are extremely grateful for the conversation with him.

an export licence. I have no information that such an application has been made."

Reiteration of this statement 33), however, did not make this misinformation more true. Apparently the KWU thought this tactic of denials employed by the Federal Government too dangerous. Interviewed by the "Welt" newspaper the industrialists corrected the statement on the same day: "Competent people" had already made contact about the granting of an export licence with the Foreign Ministry, the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Science and Technology. 34) During the following press conference, Bölling denied the Government version up to now: KWU did apply for an Export Credit Guarantee. 35)

Then the Federal Government

tried to give the impression that this application would not be granted. October 11th, 1975 the speaker for the Government, Grünwald, said on Radio Bremen: "We do not intend a collaboration with the Republic of South Africa," referring to the delivery of nuclear power plants. With the newly-found definition that he could "not regard the sale of nuclear power stations as such a nuclear collaboration", Minister Matthöfer tried to lift the contradiction that at the same time he was advocating the erection of two nuclear power plants through a South African-German consortium (Murray & Roberts/KWU). Matthöfer pointed out that in all probability the Federal Cabinet would unanimously support the delivery. As a matter of fact with the ex-

ception of a hesitating attitude of the AA 37) no objections of members of the Federal Government to the delivery of the KWU have become known. Chancellor Schmidt on the SPD party conference in Mannheim advocated the sale of nuclear reactors to all nations. 38) The same attitude was attributed to the whole of the SPD party leadership by the SPD party newspaper "Vorwärts". 39)

Besides the safeguarding-of-jobs argument another one for the advocating of the KWU project was "that a power plant is delivered to South Africa in any case." 40) Naturally foreign competitors are also interested. In November 1975, however, the Netherlands Parliament voted against the export of nuclear material to nations which have not signed the Non-proliferation Treaty and thus made impossible a 900 mill. DM share of the Rijn-Schelde-Verolme company of a consortium for the erection of South African nuclear power station formed by General Electric (USA) and BBC (Switzerland). The Netherlands group, however, demanded a 650 mill. Guilders export guarantee, thus starting a crisis in the then existing coalition. The minister of the Catholic Peoples Party, Lubbers, threatened with his resignation in case the guarantee was not accepted. 41)

The export credit is not only in the interest of the exporting firm but especially in the interest of South Africa: without such guarantee the South African government is not able to initiate such a costly project since South Africa also has suffered from the recession.

Mid of May the Parliament was told that the Federal Government had postponed the decision about the granting of an Export Credit Guarantee to the KWU — for which allegedly no application has been made — until KWU has been awarded the contract. 42)

During the Government crisis in the Netherlands in the second half of May it was said there that South Africa had awarded the Dutch-Swiss-US consortium a contract for the erection of the nuclear power plant Köberg in the Cape Province. After the Rall affair the Americans had used the "political weakness" of the Federal Government — then also under fire from the black African nations — to put themselves into a more advantageous position. Moreover, they had enticed the South Africans with the delivery of C 160 military transport aircraft as an additional bonus.

To everybody's surprise, however, the South African Electricity Corporation Escom decided on May 29th, 1976 that the contract should go to the French Framatome group. With the confidence in the well — known unscrupulousness in export matters of the French and France's weight in international politics, Pretoria politically rebuffed the governments in Bonn and Den Haag, beset by apartheid opposers. The French also found a substitute for the premium offered by the Americans: South Africa has been allowed to produce the French Mirage F 1 in licence. 43)

### **The Matter Stinks of Military**

If uranium enrichment and nuclear power station in the hands of Pretoria were normal civil eco-

conomic assets, the series of denials, lies and secrets were not understandable. They become understandable, however, if one follows the argument of the ANC that not economic but military-political reasons are the base of the nuclear ambitions of the apartheid-government and that the Federal Government is aware of this. Only recently Premier Vorster was back-stabbing the Federal Government which is painstakingly trying to uphold good relationships with the Black African nations: "We are only interested in the peaceful exploitation of nuclear power. But we are able to enrich uranium and we have the means to do it. And we have not signed the Non-proliferation Treaty." 44)

The data published about the South African nuclear project allow the conclusion that the South African uranium enrichment plant is intended for enrichment above 3 %, thus also for military purposes. VWD-journalist Lehmann writes of a "huge enrichment plant." 45) Until 1988 2.400 t of uranium are to be enriched annually, after that date possibly up to 5.000 t. 46) For this purpose, 50, respectively 100, separators would be necessary which could be housed in a 96 x 120 ft or a 144 x 120 ft building. Such a plant would not be "huge" for civil purposes. There exist in Pelindaba-Valindaba today, however, already three buildings intended to accomodate separators with the measurements of 576 x 120 ft. They are to be equipped with 1.500 separators which — based on Pretoria's data — correspond with a civil enrichment capacity of 16.500 t.

Understandably enough, this terrifying military aspect is held back by the German side. For Steag-chief Schulte the jet-nozzle system is without military importance. 47) "Der Spiegel" is of the opinion that South Africa will only in 1995 be in possession of The Bomb. 48) South Africa is also doing its bit to calm threatening public discussion. Press officer du Bois of the South African embassy in Bonn: "We do not have anything to hide in Pelindaba." Then he mentioned — incorrectly — that South Africa had made itself subject to the controls of the International Atomic Energy Board. 49) What of it if a German visitor to Pelindaba reports that Pelindaba "is intensively guarded and only accessible with special permits" 50) and if a South African newspaper retorts saying that du Bois must know about the veil of secrecy covering Pelindaba as well as the draconic laws to keep Pelindaba's secrets secret. 51) All this circumstantial evidence for the nuclear rearmament of South Africa by the Federal Republic of Germany could still be doubted were it not for the German and South African army officials travelling to and fro. There can be no doubt that General Rall got the boot because the Federal Government thought this the easiest way to obscure the nuclear scandal. If only his unhappy excursion to South Africa about which he allegedly failed to inform his superiors were the reason to pension him off prematurely, a host of other people would have to go as well. It can be accepted as proved that on the German side not only Rall's supe-





*C.D. Rohwedder, Secretary of State of The Federal Ministry of Economics with Blohm, President of the South-African-German Chamber of Trade and Industry*

riors, including Minister of Defence Leber, but also the AA, knew about Rall's mission in South Africa. 52) It is certain that under Defence Minister Helmut Schmidt, the chief of the Bundesgrenzschutz, General Grüner, as well as the Inspector-General of the army inspected South Africa as the guests of the racist regime, and also that in 1974 de Maiziére after his retirement as well as the General Count Kielmannsegg (1971 and again 1975) were flown to the Cape of Good Hope at the cost of the Vorster government. It is also certain that General Trettner after the entrance upon office of Georg Leber visited

South Africa and had his expenses paid by Pretoria. According to press officer du Bois of the South African embassy, all visitors with the rank of general have visited Pelindaba. Intensive contacts between the Bundeswehr and the armament industry and the South African Armed Forces have been proved. 53)

With the knowledge of the Ministry of Defence and of the AA, German scientists are working in leading positions in the war industry of the white minority regime and brush up their knowledge in armament plants and institutions in the Federal Republic. Thus for example Dr.

Engelter, head of a research unit of the South African Navy who had already in 1969 made several officially granted visits to the Federal Republic; thus also one of Pretoria's most important armament experts, Dr. Denkhäus, head of the metallurgical unit of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research who since eleven years with the knowledge of the German embassy in Pretoria has both German and South African nationality. — Former members of the Federal Army are procured by the Ministry of Defence for the South African armed forces. — Roughly 80 South African armament experts annually come for information tours to the Federal Republic. These visits are arranged on the basis of the German-South African cultural exchange programme. — The delivery of Milan rockets, Transall military aircraft, military lorries, helicopters and a range of military software are sufficiently documented. — This is only the background for that storm in a teacup called the "Rall-affair".

Crucial for the military importance of the nuclear cooperation is the fact undenied by the Federal Government that the parts for the uranium enrichment plant delivered by MAN have been coded with the unified NATO codes by the Federal Army. Rather indicative of this whole affair is that a petition by the AAB for the establishment of a parliamentary committee of inquiry which was addressed to all factions of the House was not answered by one single "representative of the people".

### **The policy of the Federal Government is threatening the future**

In the opinion of Dr. Helmut Bley of Hamburg university 54) the Federal Government with its policy is damaging vital interests of the FRG.

- „For a short-lived interest in exports it is risking political and economic options with the rest of the African nations.
- It is risking diplomatic isolation in the United Nations because of its, from the point of view of the Africans, obvious policy of double-dealing.
- It is contradicting the principle of German foreign policy, that is, to act with confidence-creating measures as a peacekeeper in areas of tension in which war or civil war might ensue.
- It is contradicting the principle to abstain from confrontation in the discussion of world economic problems and to look for cooperation with the majority of humanity, represented by the nations of the Third World.
- It is acting irresponsibly if it is trying to accept that in an area of extreme tension — as represented by the Republic of South Africa — the international control measures for the nuclear sector are sufficient since these measures by international law rely on the cooperation of the nation to be controlled.
- It is contravening its own agreements not to directly or indirectly purchase the uranium deposits in Namibia out of consideration for the legal authority exercised by the United Nations over Namibia, thus dispensing with any effective control over the

origin of the uranium enriched in South Africa.

- Moreover, it is probably following with its nuclear energy policy against South Africa a dated nuclear energy programme since the plans for the securing of uranium through cooperation with South Africa were based on now obsolete energy prognoses of the late 60s, and on the growth rates of the German national economy then forecast.

The situation of coal in Germany, the changed growth rates, as well as mounting risks in the nuclear power sector in all probability decisively influence the short- and medium-range economic interests of the Federal Republic in this question. The African nations of South, Central, and East Africa are justified in regarding the policy and military potential of the Republic of South Africa as a continually growing threat. The active support in strategic sectors of economic and military importance shows that in cases of conflict in contravention of statements before the United Nations by the Federal Government, it is setting aside the interests of the African nations and especially their concern with the lack of freedom and the inhuman situation of more than 15 Mio black South Africans.

The war in Angola, the entanglement of the Republic of South Africa in this war, the tensions in Rhodesia and last but not least the probability continually asserted by all serious observers of the situation in South Africa that the social and political tensions before long might result in civil war of an unexpected scale, all these reasons make it necessary



*Donald B. Sole with Erna Leber*

to prohibit all export licences of obvious political and military dimension into an area of tension of such a scale and moreover, to revise fundamentally the German South Africa policy.

The principle also valid for non-European territories declared by the KSZE (European Security Conference) to take measures enhan-

cing trust especially in areas of tension, is permanently violated by the South Africa policy of the Federal Government, especially through cooperation in the nuclear sector with participation of members of the government and companies controlled by the state. The needs of the moment are not the encouragement of the government of the Republic of South Africa to a policy of strength through open and clandestine support, but on the contrary the encouragement of speeded-up processes of change through demonstrative diplomatic and economic isolation at the end of which must stand the taking-over of the government majority by the overwhelming majority of the South African population".

*AAB* – *Anti-Apartheid-Movement*

*AA* – *Ministry of Foreign Affairs*

*BMFT* – *Ministry of Research and Technology*

*BMW* – *Ministry of Economics*

*SPD* – *Socialdemocratic Party of Germany*

#### Notes

- 1) African National Congress of South Africa, *The Nuclear Conspiracy*/ Bonn Sept. 1975
- 2) Verbal confirmation by Haunschild against "Der Spiegel" (DSp) 20.10. 1975
- 3) AP 5.10.75
- 4) FAZ 9.10.75
- 5) HB 9.10.75
- 6) FR 22.10.75
- 7) AP 21.10.75
- 8) Confidential letter Haunschild's to Roux, in: *Conspiracy* p.9
- 9) Press release of the AAB of 7.1.76 konkret 24.12.75
- 10) DSp 20.10.75; Reuters 22.8.73
- 11) DSp 20.10.75
- 12) FR 11.10.75
- 13) WK 7.10.75
- 14) Afrika-Post, Nov. 75
- 15) Blick d.d.W. 14.10.75
- 16) DW 7.10.75
- 17) Press statement Steag, 9.4.75; WAZ 6.9.75
- 18) Financial Gazette 12.4.75
- 19) Steag press statement 9.4.75
- 20) German Lower House, protocol of 16.10.75
- 21) Minister Matthöfer in FAZ 10. Oktober 76
- 22) WR 11.10.75
- 23) HB 15.10.75
- 24) FR 9.9.75
- 25) German Lower House protocol of 16.10.75
- 26) SZ 7.10.75
- 27) Blick d.d.W. 14.10.75
- 28) DSp 20.10.75
- 29) Secretary of State, Grüner, BMW am 15.10.76, answering a Parliamentary Enquiry of von Bothmer, mp
- 30) Bölling in FAZ 9.10.75
- 31) FR 12.9.75
- 32) DW 12.9.75
- 33) KStA 7.10.75, WK 7.10.75, HAZ 7.10.75, FAZ 9.10.75
- 34) DW 7.10.75
- 35) NRZ 9.10.75
- 36) HAZ 14.10.75
- 37) FAZ 6.10.75
- 38) PPP 13.11.75
- 39) Vorwärts 16.10.75
- 40) see note No. 29
- 41) FR 24.5.76
- 42) German Lower House, protocol of 19.5.75, compare SZ 8.1.76
- 43) dpa and ddp 30.5.76
- 44) Newsweek 17.5.1976
- 45) WR 11.10.75
- 46) Blick d.d.W. 14.10.75
- 47) FR 19.10.75
- 48) DSp 20.10.75
- 49) Press conference of the South African embassy of 1.10.75
- 50) vwd-correspondent Lehmann in NN 13.10.75
- 51) The Star 4.10.75
- 52) See e.g. SZ 8.1.76
- 53) DSp 6.10.75
- 54) Press conference of the AAB in Bonn of 18.12.75

*Peter J. Friedmann is collaborator of "Informationsstelle Südliches Afrika" (Information Center on Southern Africa) in Bonn, FRG.*

# „For the Time the Public should not be Informed“

*(Quotation from a Cabinet Paper, Bonn, 14 th January 1976)*

**T**he Federal Government's policy of concealment and hushing up in respect to the nuclear cooperation of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) with the Republic of South Africa (RSA) continues. With the kind of public relations work effected, the Federal Government conceals the facts more than it elucidates them. Important information is withheld also from the Federal Parliament. Members of Parliament who ask questions are being misled. Why does the Federal Government shirk the light of the public in this matter ?

What is the secret game between government ministries of the FRG, representatives of business interests, of science, of the military, South African nuclear scientists, government officials and businessmen all about ? What is there to hide ?

With its Documentation of September 1975, the African National Congress/South Africa has shed light on the obscure machinations which are not only bordering but actually constituting cases of crime. The ANC/SA presented logical evidence that between the FRG and the ruling South African minority there exists a network of cooperation in the military field which is tolerated, covered and actively supported by the Federal Government. The

Federal Government so far reacted to the ANC Documentation with wrongful accusations and diffamation, but has not refuted any of the accusations made against it or perhaps begun to alter its dangerous policy.

## **A. Construction of the Uranium Enrichment Plant, in Pelindaba, Transvaal**


In terms of military significance this is the really important project of the nuclear cooperation. The plant continues to be constructed under heavy guard by security police. Contrary to official pronouncements which give 1984 as the year of completion, the plant is likely to be ready for operation already in 1979. The following facts point to this:

- a. The time table for the trial of the big separation stage "SA 500" (which is the separation stage developed by the STEAG company, Essen, with a 500.000 cubic meters uranium-hexafluorid gas mixture work-load capacity per hour) to be carried out by STEAG (Essen), MAN (Nuremberg) and Neue Technologie (Munich) on the premises of the MTU (Motoren-Turbinen-Union, Munich), located at the fringe of the Al-lacher Forest, foresees completion of the trials before the end

S T E A G  
Kerntechnische Anlagen

Essen, 25. Nov. 1975  
Wen/Bl

N o t i z



Betr.: Ausfuhrgenehmigung für Nuclear-Komponenten

H. Prof. Fiedler teilte mir telefonisch mit, daß er am 24.11.75 an einer Besprechung im Wirtschaftsministerium in Bonn teilnahm mit dem Ziel, die Verdichter für Urananreicherungsanlagen von den Exportauflagen freizubekommen. H. Fiedler ist der Meinung, daß die Maschinen dieser Kontrolle in Zukunft nicht mehr unterliegen werden, da man seitens GHH so argumentierte, daß es sich hierbei im Grunde um völlig normale Verdichter handelt.

Was jedoch für alle an der Verbreitung des Trenndüsenverfahrens Interessierte wichtig ist, war die Ankündigung des ebenfalls anwesenden H. Heil (BMFT), daß dieser alle Hebel in Bewegung setzen werde, um das gesamte Trenndüsenverfahren unter Ausfuhrgenehmigung zu stellen. Es empfiehlt sich deshalb, H. Prof. Becker schnellstmöglich von diesem Trend zu informieren, so daß die geringe militärische Bedeutung des Verfahrens schnellstmöglich glaubhaft dargestellt wird.

*Becker*

D: Herrn Dr. Völcker  
Herrn Geppert

## Translation of a Confidential Inter-office Memo

STEAG  
Nuclear Installations

Essen, 25th November 1975  
Wen/BI

re. South Africa

### Memo

*RE: Export permission for nuclear components*

Prof. Fiedler informed me by telephone that he participated in a meeting at the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs in Bonn on November 24th, 1975 with the aim to achieve exemption from the export regulations for the compressors for uranium enrichment plants. Mr. Fiedler is of the opinion that the machines will in future no longer be subjected to these controls, since the GHH (Gutehoffnungshütte, the mother company of MAN, Nuremberg, which currently builds compressors for the uranium enrichment plant Pelindaba, RSA. Note of Transl.) argued in this way that the machines in question are, after all, entirely normal compressors. However, the point of importance for all those interested in the spreading of the jet-nozzle system (used at the Pelindaba plant. Transl.) was the announcement of the likewise present Mr. Heil of the Federal Ministry for Research and Technology that he will use all means at his disposal to see to it that the entire jet-nozzle system is placed under export permission regulations. It is therefore recommended that Prof. Becker (of the Society for Nuclear Research, Karlsruhe, the inventor of the jet-nozzle-system. Transl.) be informed about this trend as quickly as possible in order that a credible description of the unimportant military significance of the jet-nozzle system be produced without delay.

signed Wenzel

(Head of Dept. on Nuclear Installations)

cc: Dr. Völcker (Director, STEAG Nuclear Energy)

Mr. Geppert (STEAG)

of 1979. The mounting and the equipping of the separation stages installed in South Africa, which will use separation elements from the company Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm (Munich) are to be completed before the end of 1980.

- b) Until 1980, the world's three biggest coal-fed power stations are to be constructed in the Transvaal province at Kriel, Matla and Duvha, with a total production capacity of 10.200

MW. They are primarily planned for the operation of the uranium enrichment plant.

(Of the additional 18.600 MW energy supply per year which South Africa plans to provide by 1980, as much as 15.000 MW are foreseen for the Transvaal province where Pelindaba is situated).

The compressors which the MAN company in Nuremberg is to supply for the enrichment plant at Pelindaba shall be delivered to

South Africa, according to a decision by the Federal Government, in spite of the fact that this equipment is of military significance as the International List on Nuclear Equipment No. 0130 shows. Following the publication of the ANC Documentation in September 1975, there had been some temporary opposition in government circles to the supply of these machines. The compressors are being provided with NATO codification numbers. The codification is carried out by the Supplies and Stocks Department (Materialamt) of the Federal Army at St. Augustin near Bonn in cooperation with the South African Embassy, Bonn. The ANC Documentation refers to an expected decision as to whether the STEAG company, in addition to planning the jet-nozzle plant, will participate in the financing of the project. A negative decision on that point was taken by STEAG on January 29th, 1976. There is evidence that the new situation in procuring uranium led to this decision: Since due to the developments in Angola STEAG's plans of obtaining uranium from the Rössing mines in Namibia (via the West German company Urangesellschaft) will come to nothing. STEAG was unable to guarantee to the South Africans the supply of the originally foreseen 1.000 tons of uranium-oxide per year for the enrichment plant. Pretoria, in turn, likewise due to the uncertainty about the Rössing mines and because of large deals concluded with Iran, cannot take over the portion of natural uranium STEAG intended to supply to Pelindaba. (Current South African production

of uranium-oxide is 3.000 tons a year. The uranium enrichment plant at Pelindaba alone requires 5.000 tons a year).

However, even if it now looks as if the STEAG company itself does not participate in the financing of the plant, the involvement of West German banks in providing loans cannot be excluded.

### **B. Facts Pointing to the Exclusively Military Use of the Enrichment Plant**

- a. There is so far no use and requirement in South Africa for the civil utilization of the uranium from Pelindaba. Even the nuclear reactor planned for Koeberg, Cape Province, will obtain the required enriched uranium entirely from the USA and from France/Belgium. Neither are any export contracts known for the expected product.
- b. According to official South African sources, electricity generated with nuclear energy is a 100 % more expensive than the coal-generated electricity in South Africa (Dr. L. Straszacker, head of ESCOM, in "Journal Südafrika" No. 3/1973, the official organ of the South African Embassy, Cologne/Bonn). Economic reasons for the development of nuclear capacity in South Africa therefore do not exist — contrary to the pronouncements of Prime Minister Vorster in this respect.
- c. The size of the already existing buildings in Pelindaba points to the fact that much more than 100 separation stages are planned which would normal-



- ly be required to enrich 5.000 tons of uranium per year to U 235-3 %, the formula used for economic purposes such as power stations. The buildings are conceived to accomodate 1.500 separation stages, therefore facilitating enrichment in the higher degrees used for military purposes.
- d. The jet-nozzle system is the by far most uneconomic enrichment system. It has not been used anywhere. Its adoption cannot stem from economic considerations.
  - e. The inspection of the Pelindaba plant by the West German and NATO General Rall in October 1974 likewise points to the military importance.
  - f. The NATO codification of MAN supplied equipment by the Federal Army is a similar case in point.
- c. Supply of equipment for the plant by the MAN company, Nuremberg;
  - d. Participation by the Federal Army in the erection of the plant by providing unified NATO codification numbers for the equipment supplied from West Germany;
- (a/b/c/d include a violation of the Trade Act of the FRG, of the international Non-Proliferation Treaty and of respective UN-resolutions.)*
- e. STEAG, via the company Uran-gesellschaft (the Federal Government is share-holder in both companies), still holds an option for 40 % of the uranium production at Rössing, Namibia. The Federal Government has vetoed official participation (guarantees, etc.) in the production enterprise, but in view of the fact that export of minerals etc. from Namibia is against international law, the involvement of German firms constitutes on the part of the Federal Government a case of preparation of theft and of receiving stolen property.

### **C. Unlawful Deeds by the Federal Government**

The Federal Government never objected to or prevented, among other illegal actions concerning the military and nuclear cooperation with South Africa, —

- a. The provision of the licence to South Africa of the German jet-nozzle system developed by the state-owned Society for Nuclear Research (GFK), Karlsruhe;
- b. The transfer of technology as developed for the Pelindaba plant by GFK and the STEAG's plans to participate in the operation and financing of the plant; (On the contrary, deliberate promotion of the project took place in that the Federal Ministry for Research and Techno-

logy financed the development of the enrichment system although it can never be used in the FRG itself due to the big electricity supply needed to operate such a plant).

- c. Supply of equipment for the plant by the MAN company, Nuremberg;
- d. Participation by the Federal Army in the erection of the plant by providing unified NATO codification numbers for the equipment supplied from West Germany;

*(a/b/c/d include a violation of the Trade Act of the FRG, of the international Non-Proliferation Treaty and of respective UN-resolutions.)*

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### **D. Assessment of the Nuclear Cooperation**

When South African politicians and scientists declare that South Africa has the potential to build the atomic bomb, they have the uranium enrichment plant at Pelindaba in mind, not the power station at Koeberg. The construc-

tion of the Koeberg reactor is very likely a camouflage undertaking for the military-nuclear ambitions of Pretoria. Nuclear components required for the Pelindaba plant can be declared to be destined for the Koeberg reactor. The Alsthom company, for example, a member of the French consortium which is to construct the Koeberg reactor, is known to supply, together with MAN of Nuremberg, components also for the uranium enrichment plant at Pelindaba.

Even if the Koeberg reactor finally is not being constructed at all, the noise that was made about the deal created the impression as if, apart from France, no other country cooperated with South Africa in the nuclear field. But sustained by the lie to have lost the Koeberg deal of altogether DM 2,4 billion, the companies Kraftwerk-Union, General Electric, Rijnschelde, Brown Boveri and the governments in Bonn, Washington, The Hague and Bern prepare increased measures of support for the Apartheid regime. There are numerous indications that the imminent breaking-up of the Dutch Government over the question of Rijnschelde's participation in the Koeberg reactor project, objections voiced by the US Government in respect to General Electric as well as the much publicised irritations between Bonn and Pretoria was stage-acting for the benefit of the democratic public.


Without the assistance of "miraculous weapons" the Apartheid regime has lost all chances of survival. The meeting of Vorster, Kissinger and Schmidt as well as the simultaneous arrival of

Allon in the Federal Republic are a signal that the leading NATO countries want to protect the billions they invested in the Apartheid state by an irresponsible nuclear armament of Pretoria.

To the 18 appeals on the nuclear cooperation made by us since November 1974 we now add another one: We request the Federal Government to abandon and to prevent any military and any nuclear cooperation with South Africa immediately.



*Genscher, Muller, Vorster, Schmidt, June 25, 1975*



*Vorster and Kissinger in Grafenau, West Germany, June 6, 1976*





